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Abstract i 
Practical Reason and Motivation 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
This thesis focuses on the "motivational question" of practical reason: How can 
practical reasoning or perception of rational considerations motivate an agent to act? 
I will discuss several approaches to answering this question. Among these, I argue 
that quasi-Humeanism and fiisionism are more plausible because they can answer 
questions which are unresolvable by other views, and they offer new light on the 
motivational question. 
All these theories attempt to explain the connection between reason, desire, and 
motivation so as to explain the motivating force of practical reason. In chapter 1,1 
will elaborate on some key terms and then explain the motivational question in more 
detail. 
In chapter 2’ I will explore cognitive motivational intemalism (CMI) - the thesis 
that cognitive appreciation of a reason can entail the agent has a motive to act 
accordingly. 
One basic Humean doctrine states that a piece of practical reasoning has 
motivational potential only if it proceeds from something motivational (or conative) 
in nature. In chapter 3，we will see how three streams of Humeanism understand and 
argue for this doctrine. I will argue that they fail to defend it successfully. 
In chapter 4’ I argue for quasi-Humeanism, which contends that a certain sort of 
desire is an enabling condition that explains how we are able to engage in practical 
reasoning, and act in accordance with the reasoning's conclusion. This sort of desire 
figures in the background without figuring in the content of my reasoning, in the 
foreground. 
Traditional approaches to the motivational question often assume that there is a 
Abstract ii 
sharp distinction between the cognitive and the conative in explaining the 
motivational efficacy of practical reasoning. A second assumption is that there is a 
motivational priority between the cognitive and the conative. The fiisionist (chapter 5) 
wants to challenge the legitimacy of these two assumptions and offer an account of 
the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning in which the cognitive and the 
conative are conceptually interdependent and inseparable. 
In the concluding chapter I will review the approaches to the motivational question 
discussed in chapters 2 through 5.1 will underscore the weaknesses of CMI and 
strong Humeanism, while highlighting the strengths of quasi-Humeanism and the 
fusionism. I contend that quasi-Humeanism and the fusionism deserve further 
investigation for they offer new light on the motivational problem. 
Descriptors: COGNITIVIST-; DESIRE-; HUMEAN-; MOTIVATION-; 
PRACTICAL REASON-
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Desire, reason, and motivation 
I. The Issue 
This thesis focuses on what I will call the "motivational question" of practical 
reason: How can practical reasoning or perception of rational considerations 
motivate an agent to act? I will discuss several approaches to answering this question: 
cognitive motivational intemalism (which I will call "CMI," chapter 2)，Williams's 
intemalism (henceforth, "WI," chapter 2); strong, weak, and quasi- Humeanism 
(chapters 3 and 4); and what I call the fusionist approach (chapter 5). Among these, I 
argue that either a modified quasi-Humean view or a fusionist view is more plausible 
for they can answer questions which are unresolvable by other views. All these 
theories attempt to explain the connection between reason, desire, and motivation so 
as to explain the motivating force of practical reason. 
In sections II and III, I will elaborate on some key terms. Then I will explain the 
motivational question and a range of issues closely linked to it in more detail in 
sections IV through VII. Finally, aside from offering an overview of the main 
chapters, I will bring out the links between them. 
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II. Desires and Motives 
Let me begin by explaining some basic terms frequently used in discussing the 
motivational question. 
A. What is a desire? 
Roughly, desiring something is equivalent to wanting it. Desiring or wanting is a 
typical sort of motivation. The following is a functional characterization of desire. ^  
Here are five characteristic features of desire or want: 
i. Generally, desires are potentially motivating, in the sense of disposing us to 
do something or other. This is perhaps the common feature that groups 
various sorts of desire together. 
ii. Many of our desires dispose us to attempt to bring about what we desire. For 
examples, one's desire to keep fit may motivate one to exercise regularly, 
one's desire to be praised can move one to do something that wins public 
approval, one's desire to get an A in an exam may dispose one to spend more 
time on studying past exam papers, and so on. 
iii. Some desires do not dispose us to bring about what we desire. They dispose 
‘ I am indebted to Prof. Hsu Hahn for suggestions about how to tighten my characterization of desire. 
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US to seek, or attend to, information about the desired items instead. For 
example, my desire for a lasting peace in Iraq may move me to seek relevant 
news, especially when I am convinced that there is nothing I can do to 
promote it. 
iv. Some desires may dispose us to reflect on or fantasize about the objects of 
our desires. For example, one's desire to be rich and famous may dispose one 
to fantasize herself as very wealthy and widely known. 
V. Some desires dispose us to do all the aforementioned things and perhaps 
more (cf. Mele 1995: 396). 
In this thesis, when I talk of desire, usually I use it in the first two senses unless I 
have specified otherwise. 
B. Motivation and desire 
Can anything other than a desire move one to action? This is among the 
controversial questions I will discuss. Here I merely want to point out that there is a 
conceptual distinction between being motivated and having a desire. For instance, 
one can be motivated to do something by a sense of duty, and having a sense of duty 
need not imply wanting to do it. If I were a police officer and a good friend had 
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broken the law, out of a sense of duty I might be motivated to arrest him, even 
though I strongly desire not to do so.^  Hence, a sense of duty is a plausible candidate 
for motivation that is not reducible to a sort of wanting. 
C. The intensity of a desire and the strength of a motive 
The strength of a motive is not reducible (or equivalent) to a desire's "felt violence 
or intensity" (Mele 1998: 26). Some people may think that the more violent or 
intense the desire is, the stronger the motive would be. If it is really the case, then we 
can motivate a person to do a certain thing by making his relevant desire more 
violent or intense. But a phenomenologically intense desire may be motivationally 
weaker than a competing desire with little or no phenomenological intensity. For 
example, a strong willed person who experiences a phenomenologically intense urge 
for chocolate ice-cream may be more strongly inclined to forego it by a desire that 
has little phenomenological intensity (let's say his desire to keep fit). 
At the core of Humeanism is the thesis that desires (or affective/ sentimental states) 
play a central role in explaining the motivational power of practical reasoning. If a 
Humean theory of motivation must be combined with a phenomenological 
conception of desire, it would become unnecessarily weak or unattractive. This 
3 I borrow this example from Chris Fraser. 
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explains why a plausible Humean theory of motivation must not be combined with a 
phenomenological conception of desire. 
D. The strength of a motive and an agent's belief 
It is not the case that an agent's having a stronger motive to (p than to \\j is 
reducible or equivalent to her believing that it would be better to (p than to \\} (Mele 
1998: 26). This is because there are cases of weakness of will. Weakness of will is 
the condition in which, while understanding what it would be (more) worthwhile to 
do, an agent is not motivated to act accordingly, and so instead does something else 
(cf. Blackburn 1996). 
E. The difficulty of working out a conception of motivation 
There are two obstacles that make the construction of a precise conception of 
motivation difficult: The varieties of motivational phenomena and the ambiguity of 
the concept of motivation. Let me discuss these one by one. 
a. Varieties of motivational phenomena 
‘Motivation，is an umbrella term that lumps together many similar or related terms, 
such as ‘desire，，'want,' 'hope,' 'wish,' 'goal,' ‘interest,，'concern,' 'intention,' and 
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possibly 'value,' and 'reason,' and perhaps more. It is difficult to identify what these 
terms share except for the basic fact that they are "potentially motivating." What 
binds them together is perhaps just this feature of being potentially motivating. 
Roughly, something is potentially motivating only if it can be a potential cause of 
action.4 
b. The ambiguity of the concept of motivation 
Besides coming in many varieties, motivation often refers to at least two different 
sorts of things. We may approach the question of what motivation is by studying this 
question: What is it for an agent A to be motivated to (p? There are at least two 
interpretations (see Mele 1995: 387). First, being motivated to (p is sometimes 
conceived of as requiring a motivated doing of (p. Second, being motivated to (p is 
sometimes conceived of as having some motivation to (p without necessarily having 
motivation sufficient to take action. 
Motivation comes from being in a motivational state. But the concept of a 
"motivational state" is also ambiguous (Mele 1995: 388). In a broad sense, we may 
say that any mental state that plays a significant or typical role in generating a 
motivated action can be counted a motivational state. In this way, the concept 
4 It's hard to define the concept ‘potentially motivating' without the threat of circularity. How should 
we understand this concept? This is an important question to be solved by any satisfactory theory of 
motivation. 
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'motivational state' (or 'motivation') embraces a variety of related concepts such as 
'desire,' 'want,' 'hope,' 'wish,' 'goal,' ‘interest，，'concern,' 'intention,' possibly 
'value' and ‘reason，，and perhaps more. In a narrower sense, on the other hand, 
motivational states include only states that themselves constitute motivation. 
In this thesis, unless specified otherwise, I take motivation or a motivational state 
to be any mental state that can play a significant role or typically plays a role in 
generating action. Roughly, being in a motivational state is having a tendency to 
perform some action (p without necessarily having sufficient force to (p. 
III. Reason, Reasoning, and Practical Reason 
Reason - conceived as a general human capacity - is the capacity for 
"truth-seeking" and "problem-solving" (Belsey 1995). It is different from instinct or 
faith in that its results are "intellectually trustworthy" (Belsey 1995) or credible. 
They are trustworthy because they are supported by rational relations to beliefs that 
are themselves well supported by assessments according to the norms of thought and 
language. 
Reasoning - conceived of as a series of rational mental operations - i s a process 
aimed at solving a practical problem ('What should I do in this situation?') or 
theoretical problem ('What is the truth on this matter?'). When you are thinking 
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about what to do in a certain condition or what the truth is on a certain matter, you 
have to think about potential reasons for or against proposed solutions. You reason 
well when the reasons that you find, or give, provide sufficient support for the 
proposed solutions. They make it more likely that the proposed solutions are true, 
appropriate, or justified.^ 
In this thesis, when I talk of practical reasoning, I refer to any series of rational 
mental operations aiming at a conclusion [or a solution] concerning what to do 
(Blackburn 1996). Moreover, when I talk of practical reason, I refer to the general 
human capacity for problem-solving, namely for resolving the problem of what one 
is to do. From time to time, I use the terms 'practical reasoning,' 'practical reason,' 
and 'practical deliberation' interchangeably. Furthermore, when I talk of a reason for 
action or a practical reason, I refer to any rational consideration which provides 
prima facie support for the doing or avoidance of a certain (sort of) action. 
IV. The Question of the Gap 
Is there a gap between perception of a reason for action or practical reasoning and 
an agent's being motivated to act accordingly? I call this the question of the gap.6 
How is it connected to the motivational question, namely how practical reasoning or 
5 In elaborating on what reasoning refers to, I have borrowed from Christopher Kirwan (1995). 
6 In clarifying this question, I am indebted to Professors Hsu Hahn, Wong Kai Yee and Chris Fraser. 
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perception of rational considerations can motivate an agent to act? In this section, I 
want to show that the two questions are conceptually intertwined. That means, a 
person's view on how practical reason is connected to motivation is somehow not 
quite separable from his view on whether there is a gap between practical reason and 
motivation. 
The following is one way of understanding the connection between practical 
reason and motivation. Perception of a reason for action or practical reasoning "can" 
entail or generate "some" motivating force. But whether the entailed or generated 
force is sufficient to motivate an agent to act accordingly depends on auxiliary 
factors. Factors such as the strength and the persistence of the agent's will and his 
character or personality play a role in constituting his capability to act accordingly. 
Moreover, the absence of interfering factors such as weakness of will and 
psychological or mental problems is important in "allowing" the agent to be 
motivated to act accordingly. 
If one upholds the above view of the connection between practical reason and 
motivation, one tends to hold a view concerning the question of the gap in this way. 
Whenever there is a gap between perception of a reason for action or practical 
reasoning and an agent's being moved to act accordingly，the gap is brought by the 
absence of normal auxiliary factors or the presence of interfering factors, and not 
Introduction 10 
because the recognition of a rational consideration or the cognitive process of 
practical reasoning cannot entail or generate motivating force. In such cases, the 
entailed or generated force will not be sufficient to move the agent to act accordingly. 
There is then a gap between practical reason and motivation, but the gap is not 
because practical reason cannot entail or generate motivating force. 
Another way of understanding the connection between practical reason and 
motivation is this. Perception of a reason for action or practical reasoning "cannot" 
entail or generate motivating force. In other words, it is "not" potentially motivating. 
Perception of a reason for action or practical reasoning has to be accompanied by 
some conative elements in order to be potentially motivating. 
Those who hold this second view of the connection between practical reason and 
motivation tend to claim that there is a gap between practical reasoning or 
recognition of a reason for action and the agent's being motivated to act accordingly. 
This is because pure recognition is conation-free, and without some conative fuel, it 
cannot motivate. 
Whether there is a gap between recognition and an agent's being motivated to act 
accordingly and how we should understand such a gap, if it exists, are two of the 
questions implicated in the motivational question. When we reflect on how 
perception of a reason for action or the cognitive process of practical reasoning can 
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give rise to motivation, our answer depends on how we understand the connection or 
relation between the cognitive and the motivational or conative. Our view of the 
connection is not separable from our view of whether there is a gap between the 
agent's cognitive recognition and conative reaction. Hence, in trying to answer the 
motivational question, we must also consider the question of the gap. 
V. The Motivational Problem 
In this section, I argue that practical reasoning does not necessarily provide 
sufficient motivation for action, but it is also not merely accidentally connected to 
action. Then I suggest that the motivational problem can be formulated more 
precisely as follows: How can we account for the motivational efficacy of practical 
reason if practical reason is neither necessarily motivating nor accidentally 
motivating? I outline two ways of approaching this question:- the dichotomous 
approach and the non-dichotomous approach or flisionist approach. 
It seems that there is some degree of connection between practical deliberation and 
motivation. Sometimes we are motivated to act in a certain way which is our best 
choice in response to a practical problem. And we know that it is our best choice 
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through a process of practical deliberation, namely thinking about what is best to do 
in response to the problem. This process is evaluative in nature - we try to figure out 
what it would be most worthwhile for us to do. Since we are motivated to act upon a 
decision after an evaluative process, presumably there is some connection between 
evaluative practical deliberation and our being motivated to act accordingly. But how 
strong is this connection? There are at least two points that we can make about its 
strength. 
First, practical deliberation and motivation are not necessarily connected. In other 
words, the connection between the two is not guaranteed in every case. Practical 
deliberation is not necessarily motivating. For if practical deliberation - understood 
as an evaluative process aiming to determine what to do - and motivation are in all 
cases necessarily connected, then weakness of will seems impossible. Weakness of 
will refers to a condition in which, while recognizing what it would be worthwhile 
(or best) to do, one is not motivated to take action accordingly, but does something 
else instead (see Blackburn 1996). Weakness of will is a common occurrence, so 
unless we can explain it away, we are not justified in claiming that practical 
deliberation necessarily provides motivation sufficient for the agent to act on the 
conclusion of the deliberation. 
On the other hand, practical deliberation and motivation are not merely 
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accidentally connected, either. If practical reasoning and motivation were 
accidentally connected, there would be no grounds for blaming a person who 
happens to lack the relevant motivation to act reasonably or morally. Whether or not 
one can be motivated to act reasonably (or morally) would then be a matter of chance 
or grace. However, it seems at least sometimes we do deliberately act for reasons, 
after a process of thinking about what it would be worthwhile to do. In such cases, 
being motivated to act reasonably (or morally) is not a matter of chance or grace, but 
a matter of "rational control" 一 our capacity of acting in accordance with our 
reasonable or best judgment. Hence, practical deliberation and motivation are not 
accidentally connected together, at least in the case in which the agent deliberately 
acts for reasons. So the connection between the two is not contingent, although it is 
not necessarily enough to guarantee action in every case. 
If practical reasoning does not necessarily ensure sufficient motivation for action 
but also is not merely accidentally connected to motivation, then how are we to 
understand the connection between the two? How are we going to explain the 
motivational efficacy of practical reasoning - if practical reasoning is neither 
necessarily motivating nor accidentally motivating? This is the motivational problem 
that any theorists of motivation are supposed to solve. There are at least two ways of 
handling this problem: the dichotomous approach and the non-dichotomous approach 
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(or the fusionist approach). 
Supporters of the dichotomous approach welcome the distinction between 
practical deliberation and motivation. They acknowledge that it is one thing to 
recognize what it would be worthwhile to do (cognitive appreciation), and it is 
another thing whether one has a relevant motive (or desire) to take action accordingly 
(conative response). They understand evaluative beliefs (operating components in 
practical reasoning) and desires (potentially motivating components) as distinct 
entities. Or, they take cognitive appreciation (cognition) and conative response 
(conation) to be independent components. Hence, to believe that it would be 
worthwhile for you to do something is not in itself to desire to do it. Cognitive 
appreciation alone neither produces nor entails the relevant conative reaction. 
If one accepts this dichotomous picture - a sharp dichotomy between cognition 
(practical deliberation) and conation (motivation) - one inevitably encounters a gap 
between cognition (evaluative beliefs or practical deliberation) and conation (the 
relevant desires or motivation). And the task of a theory of motivation is thus to 
bridge this gap in order to make sense of cases in which the agent is not weak-willed 
(Helm 2001: 191). If one takes practical reasoning to be a purely cognitive process 
and desire or motivation to be a characteristically (but not necessarily purely) 
conative response or reaction, then one encounters a gap between practical 
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deliberation and motivation. Some people believe that the process of reaching a 
conclusion about what it is worthwhile to do is a purely cognitive process. But then 
they encounter this problem: how can something purely cognitive give rise to 
motivation? This problem becomes even more serious when combined with the 
belief that what is motivationally effective must be connected to people's conative, 
affective, or sentimental states. These motivational states are understood as 
something more than cognitive states. Hence, purely cognitive practical reasoning 
alone cannot give rise to motivation. There is a gap between reason and motivation. 
Hence, the motivational efficacy of practical deliberation becomes a problem to be 
solved. 
A dichotomous theorist has to explain why (1) some non-weak-willed persons can 
act for reasons, while at the same time holding that (2) there is a gap between 
practical deliberation and motivation. Denying the possibility of (1) is unacceptable, 
for persons do have the capacity to act in accordance with the conclusions of 
practical reasoning, when they did not originally desire to do what they conclude 
they should do. Denying (2) is unacceptable for dichotomous theorists, because they 
are already committed to it. But there is a prima facie tension between (1) and (2) 
that forms a puzzle for the dichotomous theorists. Interestingly, they encounter this 
puzzle partly because of their own assumption that there is a sharp dichotomy 
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between reason and desire or other motivating states. 
Other philosophers, such as Griffin (1996), Hurley (2001) and Helm (2001)，have 
attempted to work out non-dichotomous theories of motivation. In chapter 5,1 
present one such non-dichotomous alternative. In constructing this alternative 一 
which I call the fusionist alternative - 1 have borrowed much from Griffin (1996). 
While his Value Judgement (1996) concentrates on the nature of value judgement, I 
think his insights can be employed in explaining the connection between practical 
deliberation and motivation. Perhaps a better theory of motivation lies in the 
rejection of the dichotomy between reason and motivation and at the same time 
re-examining our understanding of the connection between reason and desire (cf. 
Helm 2001: 192). This is a road to a fusionist approach of explaining the 
motivational power of practical reasoning. 
VI. The Motivational Problem: 
A factual inquiry or a normative inquiry? 
When we explore the motivational question, what sort of inquiry are we engaged 
in? Is this a factual inquiry or a normative inquiry? In this section, I attempt to 
characterize the motivational question as a factual question. An effective way to 
make this point clear is by contrasting this factual question with a normative question 
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of what counts as a reason for action. The primary concern of this thesis is to explore 
a prima facie factual issue, namely what makes practical reason motivating. 
A. What counts as reason for action? 
When does something count as reason for action, and by what criterion? Whether 
something can be credited as reason is a normative question. We are asking for the 
rational or normative criteria that qualify something as reason. The fact that someone 
does not accept a potential rational consideration is not yet a reason for rejecting its 
status as a potential reason. Whether the potential rational consideration should be 
accepted or rejected is a normative question - its acceptance or rejection should be 
determined by other relevant reasons for or against it. This normative question is 
within the sphere of reason, which is characterized by the characteristic practice of 
giving and asking for reasons. A deep and important philosophical question is to 
explain what aspects of such practices determine whether a consideration should 
count as reason or not. However, this question is not the focus of this thesis, so I will 
set it aside. I will assume that we know from common sense what a good reason for 
action is. 
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B. What makes practical reasoning motivating? 
What makes reason motivating - whether explicit pieces of practical reasoning or 
direct perception of rational considerations? Where does the motivational fuel of 
practical reason come from? This is the focus of this thesis. Roughly, this prima facie 
factual issue may be separated from another issue, namely whether or not the 
grounding of reasons for action should lie in the agent's subjective motivational set 
(that is, the agent's subjective motivating states, such as desires and values) or in 
external circumstances. The latter issue concerns the conditions under which such 
normative claims as the following are warranted: "There is reason for a person P to 
do action A" or "A is the reasonable thing for P to do" (Mele 2003: 89). Note that our 
prima facie factual inquiry takes it for granted that sometimes people do act for 
reasons. We want to know where the practical power or influence of practical reason 
comes from: What makes practical reason or reasoning motivating? In other words, 
we are interested in how practical reasoning generates motivation in actual human 
beings.8 
8 But is motivational inquiry necessarily or merely factual in nature? Korsgaard (1986; see also 
chapter 2 of this thesis, especially § V) argues that motivational inquiry of practical reason indeed 
depends on (or presupposes) normative inquiry - what can be counted as reason for action, or whether 
a potential consideration can be counted as a reason for action, but not vice versa. If Korsgaard is right, 
then motivational inquiry is not separable from normative inquiry. 
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VII. Motivational Priority: Reason or desire? 
A. Motivational problem and motivational priority 
When theorists of motivation attempt to account for the motivational efficacy of 
practical reason, they may encounter the question of motivational priority between 
reason and desire. They have to decide which of the two makes practical reason 
motivationally effective ultimately. The theorists of motivation have to decide which 
one is motivationally more prior or fundamental. But why should we care about 
motivational priority? 
B. Why should we care about the priority? 
Investigations of the motivational priority between reason and desire can have 
significant implications for other fields, especially ethics. If ultimately the motivating 
power of moral reasons depends on an agent's subjective motivational conditions, 
then whether a moral reason can motivate an agent becomes conditional: it depends 
on the agent's desires, preferences, goals, and the like. This would be a serious 
problem for many moral rationalists or cognitivists. Many moral rationalists or 
cognitivists want to argue for the non-conditional motivational efficacy of moral 
reasons. To settle the issue concerning the motivational efficacy of moral reasons, we 
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have to examine the motivational priority between reason and desire. 
C. Is there really a priority? 
The above consideration presupposes that reason and desire are distinct sorts of 
things. Unless they are, it makes less sense to talk about the motivational priority 
among them. Hence, one can argue for certain views of the motivational priority only 
if it makes sense to draw a sharp distinction between these two entities. If it doesn't, 
the issue of priority must be approached in a different way. 
There are at least two strategies to approach the connection between reason and 
desire: 
(i) One can argue for a sharp distinction between reason and desire, and 
then further argue for a certain motivational priority between the two; or 
(ii) One can argue against a sharp distinction between reason and desire. 
One can develop this line of thought in at least two different ways: either 
one can argue that (a) it does not make sense to talk about the 
motivational priority between the two, or one can argue that (b) they 
could be intertwined, but still one part or aspect could be dominant in 
some situations.^ 
9 I thank Chris Fraser for helping me to clarify these two possibilities. 
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Roughly, chapters 2 to 4 below explore the first approach, and chapter 5 explores the 
second. 
VIII. An Overview of the Following Chapters 
My aim in this section is twofold. I will give a brief, explicit description of what 
the following chapters are intended to accomplish. Moreover, I will bring out the 
links between them. 
A. Cognitivist motivational intemalism 
In chapter 2，I explore Korsgaard's (1986) version of cognitivist motivational 
intemalism (CMI), an important rival of William's intemalism (1980) (WI). WI 
makes three claims. First, if there is practical reason, it must be capable of motivating 
persons (the Intemalism Requirement, or IR). Second, for a certain rational mental 
operations to have motivational output, it must have motivational input. I call this the 
principle of desire-in, desire-out, or "PDIO" (cf. Wallace 1990). Third, something in 
us must make us capable of being motivated by some rational considerations 
(authorized by certain rational mental operations), and this something will be part of 
our subjective motivational set (S). Korsgaard argues that WI misunderstood IR 
when WI tried to concretize, or interpret IR with the latter two claims. In other words, 
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the last two claims do not follow from IR. 
IR is applicable only to those people who are practically rational. A person is 
practical rational only if he fulfils two conditions: (1) he is able to perform certain 
rational mental operations through which one is able to judge whether a 
consideration is reasonable or compelling; and at the same time (2) he is able to 
allow the transmission of the compellingness of the consideration to one's motivation, 
and hence to be moved to do something accordingly. According to Korsgaard, a 
practically rational agent's intellectual appreciation of a reason for action (condition 
1) can entail the agent has a motive to act accordingly (condition 2). 
If Korsgaard is right, then whether a consideration can be credited as a reason for 
action is dependent on some sort of rational mental operations but not on an agent's S. 
So, if she is right, her version of CMI would present an important challenge to WI. 
Since WI assumes the truth of PDIO, which is an essential assumption of 
Humeanism in general, the challenge to WI is also applicable to Humeanism. 
B. Varieties of Humeanism 
In chapter 3,1 discuss three attempts of characterizing and defending PDIO and I 
argue that they fail. 
I believe that all sorts of Humeanism uphold a general intuition that desires (or 
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affective/ sentimental states) play an essential role in explaining the motivational 
efficacy of practical reasoning. In the chapter 2，I tried to capture this Humean 
intuition by PDIO. In chapter 3,1 consider three possibilities of characterizing and 
arguing for PDIO: bald instrumentalism, the argument from direction of fit, and 
partial Humeanism (PH). I conclude that all are unsuccessful. 
One common problem with these attempts is that, despite their common goal of 
providing a general theory of the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning, the 
types of practical reasoning they may account for are limited. At best, they can 
explain only cases in which an agent (obviously) has an antecedent desire. 
I conclude that a satisfactory Humean theory should satisfy at least the following 
two requirements. First, instead of providing a narrowly preconceived explanation of 
the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning, the candidate theory should account 
for different sorts of practical reasoning, including at least means-end reasoning as 
well as non-means-end reasoning. Second, the candidate theory must uphold the 
general Humean intuition that desires (or affective/ sentimental states) play a 
significant role or normally play a role in explaining the motivational efficacy of 




In chapter 4,1 argue that a certain kind of desire is a necessary enabling condition 
that accounts for how we are able to engage in practical reasoning and act in accord 
with the reasoning's conclusion. This kind of desire takes part in the background 
without taking part in the content of our reasoning, in the foreground. I call the 
position supporting this thesis quasi-Humeanism. To establish this thesis, I need to 
take two steps. The first is to construct a two-level model of practical deliberation. 
Specifically, I argue for a background-foreground framework to account for the 
operation of practical deliberation. Granting for the sake of discussion that this 
framework is true; I argue that desire can figure in the background without figuring 
in the foreground. The second step is to explain the role of background desire in the 
motivational efficacy of practical reasoning. I argue that background desire is a 
necessary enabling condition for engaging in practical reasoning and taking action 
according to the reasoning's conclusion. 
Quasi-Humeanism seems to be able to meet the double requirement for a 
satisfactory Humean theory stated in chapter 3. First, it seems to be able to account 
for non-means-end reasoning, whereas single-level models such as bald 
instrumentalism, the argument from direction of fit, and PH cannot. Second, it 
embraces the general Humean intuition and characterizes the intuition in a more 
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plausible way. It attempts to account for the PDIO by showing that background 
desire is a necessary enabling condition for all operation of practical reasoning. 
D. Fusionist alternative 
In chapter 5,1 try to outline and argue for a fusionist approach (fusionism) to 
motivation. Fusionism attempts to offer a theory of motivation in which cognitive 
appreciation of reasons and conative reaction are conceptually interdependent and 
inseparable. Since the cognitive and the conative are inseparably fused whenever an 
agent really grasps a piece of practical reason, the agent 一 under normal conditions -
is motivated to intend in accordance with it. 
If the fusionist theory is plausible, then it will probably present a serious challenge 
to a dichotomous approach. In a sense, we may characterize the theories discussed in 
chapters 2 through 4 as dichotomous in spirit. Generally, the dichotomous approach 
is based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that there is a sharp distinction 
between the cognitive and the conative in explaining the motivational force of 
practical reasoning. Second, it assumes that there is a motivational priority between 
the cognitive and the conative, namely, that one of the two is motivationally more 
fundamental. 
In chapter 5,1 begin by clarifying these two assumptions. Then I discuss the 
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motivation for the fusionist alternative. The core of this chapter lies in my attempt to 
outline an argument in support of fusionism. Before the conclusion, I point out three 
merits of fusionism. 
I believe that there is one lesson to be learned from the fusionist attempt - it shows 
us another alternative in handling the issue of the motivational efficacy of practical 
reason. In constructing its view, fusionism tries to show us that the long-lasting issue 
and the attempted solutions may rest on some misleading or unquestioned 
assumptions. No matter whether it fails or succeeds, it may lead us to a deeper 
understanding of some of the very basic assumptions about the issue and the 
attempted solutions. Hence, fusionism deserves our attention and further 
investigation. 
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2 
Cognitivist Motivational Intemalism: 
Korsgaard's attempt 
The fact that [a law of reason] might not govern conduct, even when 
someone understood it, is no reason for skepticism: the necessity is in the 
law, and not in us (Korsgaard 1986: 25). 
I. Introduction 
Can reason alone motivate action? In this chapter I explore a version of cognitivist 
motivational intemalism (hereafter CMI) - the thesis that intellectual appreciation of 
a reason for action can entail the agent has a motive to act accordingly. In other 
words, reason alone is potentially motivating. I examine Korsgaard's version (1986) 
of CMI, an important rival ofWilliams's intemalism (hereafter WI) (1980)] 
The dispute between CMI and WI concerns the proper characterization of the 
intemalism requirement (hereafter IR\ namely, that if there is practical reason, 
conceived as any reasoning process "aiming at a conclusion concerning what to do" 
(Blackburn 1996: 296), it can motivate. Or, shifting our focus from reason as a 
reasoning process to the issue of crediting a particular norm as a reason for action, 
1 How I make sense of or argue for CMI in this chapter is not exactly like Korsgaard's attempt (1986). 
But the main idea is borrowed from her. Here, I don't have enough space to say clearly the differences 
between my version of CMI and hers. Also, by discussing CMI, I don't mean that I favor it. I hope my 
discussion of CMI will show its importance in the issue of whether or not reason alone can motivate 
action. 
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then IR is: if a candidate norm can qualify as a reason for action, it must be capable 
of motivating some person. 
CMI suggests that cognitive grasp of a rational consideration can entail the agent 
has a motive to act accordingly. WI accepts the claim that an agent's whole-hearted 
acceptance of a rational consideration can entail some degree of motivation to act 
accordingly. But WI adds a restriction to this claim, namely, that whether an agent 
has a reason to act in a certain way “is relative to" the agent's subjective motivational 
set (hereafter S). 
Roughly, Korsgaard's strategy in clarifying the functioning of the IR can be 
summed up as follows. First, she discusses the requirement for being a practical 
reason or a reason for action. She introduces and accepts IR. I will show this in 
section II. 
Second, she discusses some typical cases where our capacity of reasoning or a 
rational consideration plays a role in guiding deliberation and action. Instrumental 
reasoning is a typical case. By investigating how an agent engages in instrumental 
reasoning, she tries to show how IR functions. She suggests that, for a person to be 
practically rational, he must fulfill two conditions. First, he must be capable of 
2 The term ‘cognitivist motivational intemalism' is borrowed from Audi (2003). However, my 
formulation of CM/is a bit different from his. He says, "{CMI suggests that] some degree of 
motivation is internal to any sincere self-addressed moral judgement" (91). My formulation is of 
practical reason claims in general, which goes beyond the scope of moral reason claims. I formulate 
CMI as a view which holds that intellectual grasp of a rational consideration can entail a motive to act 
accordingly. 
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performing certain rational mental operations, through which he can recognize 
rational considerations; second, he must be capable of letting the motivational force 
of the rational considerations be transmitted to his motivation. This second step will 
be explained in section III. 
I will discuss the third step in section IV. After showing how IR functions, she 
shows how it malfunctions - how it is misunderstood in skepticism about practical 
reason. IR doesn't imply that a rational consideration can "in every case" motivate.^ 
Rather, IR suggests that if someone is motivated by a rational consideration, he is 
necessarily moved by the compellingness of it, and this is so only if he fulfills the 
two conditions for being practically rational (hereafter CPR). The skeptic about 
practical reason cannot disprove the compellingness of a rational consideration by 
showing that any particular individual is not moved by it. Korsgaard reminds us, "the 
necessity [or compellingness] is in the law [or the norm guiding our deliberation or 
action], and not in us" (1986: 25). 
In the remaining sections (from sections V to VII)，I will focus on the fourth step. 
In this step, she tries to weaken Wlhy presenting an argument in this form: WI is a 
form of motivational skepticism about practical reason and it assumes content 
skepticism. However, content skepticism is controversial. Therefore, WI is 
3 In other words, IR doesn't imply that a rational consideration is necessarily motivating. 
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controversial. The main idea of her argument is to deny that WTs claim that a 
candidate norm might not govern conduct even when someone understands it gives 
reason for skepticism. She holds that motivational analysis - whether a candidate 
reason can motivate - depends on content analysis — whether the candidate can be 
recognized or justified through rational mental operations, "but not vice versa.”4 She 
illustrates this point by the case of prudence. I will explain the details below. 
II. Intemalism Requirement {IR) 
People sometimes do things for reasons. The question is: according to what 
criterion can we judge that a person P did action A because of reason R7 If we can 
accurately articulate this standard, we can tell how to "credit" a consideration as a 
reason for action. In this section, I'm going to introduce a requirement for something 
to be a reason for action. The task of theorists of practical reason is to try to offer 
interpretations of this requirement. Before we judge which interpretation is better, we 
have to understand what the candidate interpretations try to interpret. 
Roughly, if a consideration is a reason for action, it must be capable of motivating 
some person. Let's call this the intemalism requirement, or IR (cf. Korsgaard 1986: 
4 That is, it is wrong to suggest that whether a candidate reason can be (or should be) credited as a 
reason for action depends on some sort of motivational analysis, namely whether the candidate reason 
can motivate some particular individual. Otherwise, a candidate reason can be rejected merely because 
the fact (or the possibility) that some particular individual cannot be motivated accordingly though he 
understood the candidate reason. 
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11). How do we justify IRl The main idea can be put this way. We know that if R is 
P's reason for doing A, then R must have a role in explaining P，s doing In other 
words, R must figure in the explanation of P,s doing To have a role in explaining 
P,s doing A, R must acquire the status of being a motive for P,s doing A. It seems to 
be true that something is a motive for a particular action only if it can motivate 
someone to do that action. For R to acquire the status of a motive for P's doing A, it 
must be capable of motivating P to do A. Therefore, if R is P，s reason for doing A, it 
must be capable of motivating P. (cf. Alston 1967: 401) Generally, if something is a 
reason for action, it must be capable of motivating someone. 
III. Condition of being Practically Rational (CPR) 
Korsgaard accepts IR (1986: 11). She knows that to argue for her version of CMI 
and against WI, she needs to work out a proper interpretation of IR and at the same 
time to show WTs misunderstanding of IR. Now the question she faces is: how to 
work out a proper interpretation of IR? She thinks about typical cases where some 
process of reasoning or a rational consideration does play a role in guiding 
deliberation or action. Instrumental reasoning is a typical case. Through investigating 
how an agent engages in instrumental reasoning, Korsgaard tries to show how IR 
functions. By showing how IR functions, she gives her interpretation, or more 
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properly, her characterization of IR. In this section, I will discuss how Korsgaard 
works out her characterization of IR. 
A. Instrumental reasoning and CPR 
What happens when a person engages in instrumental reasoning? The person's 
ends, desires, or preferences contain motivational fuel, in the sense that they can 
make the person to try to bring the circumstances to fit them. For example, given I 
want to finish my master thesis within this academic year, I will try to modify my 
situations - let's say, tidying up my messy desk in order to provide enough space for 
thesis-writing, or avoiding and canceling some unnecessary meetings with my 
friends, classmates so as to give enough time for my thesis-writing - to make my 
goal achievable. 
Given the agent has a certain goal. When it is pointed out - through instrumental 
reasoning - to the agent that an action is a means to his goal, then, if the agent is 
rational the motivational fuel attached to the goal is transmitted to the means. The 
consideration that the action is a means to his goal moves him to take action. In this 
case - that it is the consideration sets his body in motion - we can say that 
instrumental reason has an influence on action. By this observation, we can 
generalize, that a practically rational person who can engage in instrumental 
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reasoning is equipped with two capacities: first, being capable of processing a certain 
rational mental operations. In the case of instrumental reasoning: seeking the causal 
relation of a certain means to a certain end. Second, being capable of allowing the 
motivational fuel to be transmitted from his goal (or desire, or preference) along the 
paths laid out by the mental operations to his motivation. 
WI and CMI accept that means/ end reasons (or instrumental reasoning) have 
practical potential, in the sense that they can motivate. Means/ end reasons draw on 
an obvious motivational source - the agent's ends, desires, or preferences. It is 
commonly accepted that so long as available means to given end is pointed out to the 
agent, he has a prima facie reason and also a motive to act accordingly. What WI and 
CMI disagree with each other is over the issue whether there can be reasons for 
action without drawing motivational source from the agent's ends, desires, or 
preferences. Or, can there be unconditional - in the sense of being independent of 
one's S - reasons for action? 
Korsgaard wants to argue for a stronger claim - from the above analysis of what it 
is for a practically rational person to engage in instrumental reason. She thinks that 
the above analysis not only applies to an instrumentalist conception of practical 
reason, but also applies to theories of practical reason in general. The general claim is 
about CPR. The condition involves two components: first, it is about the capacity of 
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"performing certain rational mental operations" - not limited to instrumental 
reasoning; and second, it is of the capacity of allowing the "[transmission of] motive 
force ... along the paths laid out by those operations" (1986: 13). 
B. Connecting IR and CPR 
What's the relation between IR and Korsgaard's characterization of CPR? IR is a 
standard forjudging whether a consideration or a certain reasoning process can earn 
the status of a reason for action or a sort of practical reasoning. The question is: 
Under what condition we can say that the standard is properly used or is met? The 
answer is, to let IR functions properly or to met this standard, two necessary 
conditions should be met.5 These conditions are stated in CPR. Only those who are 
practically rational can properly apply IR, and meet IR. 
Consider theoretical reasoning. For CMZ, the reasons why an argument is sound 
and the reasons why you are convinced/ moved to do something implied or derived 
from the conclusion are the same. If you really understand why the argument is 
sound, you will at the same time be convinced/ moved to follow up on the 
consequences or implications of the argument. Understanding a piece of reasoning 
entails having the relevant motive to do something logically or rationally connected 
s Here, I simply want to claim that they are two necessary conditions for a person to be practically 
rational, whether they are also sufficient is another matter. 
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with it (cf. Korsgaard 1986: 10). In practical reasoning, the reasons why a 
consideration is reasonable and the reasons why you are moved to act accordingly 
are the same. If you understand why you have the reason to do an action, you will at 
the same time be motivated. In a word, grasping a rational consideration can entail 
having the motive to act accordingly. So, to be theoretically or practically rational 
requires the same capacities: (1) to be able to perform certain rational mental 
operations through which one is able to judge whether an argument is sound or 
whether a consideration is reasonable or compelling; and at the same time (2) to 
allow the transmission of the compellingness of the argument or the consideration to 
one's motivation, and hence one is moved to do something accordingly. Here are two 
examples. In a case of theoretical reasoning, if one recognizes that - through a 
process of argument - one has some inconsistency in holding a set of beliefs of a 
certain issue, one will be moved to give up the false beliefs, or to revise some minor 
beliefs in order to be consistent. In a case of practical reasoning, if one comes to 
realize that — through a process of deliberation - one has reason to give up the 
practice of meat-eating, other factors kept constant, one will be moved to act 
accordingly. 
We can make the relation between IR and CPR explicit. IR can function properly 
only in those cases where the two inseparable capacities contributing to CPR are 
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present. IR doesn't imply that a rational consideration can in any case motivate. Only 
in those cases where CPR is met, IR functions properly. 
IV. What IR Implies and Doesn't Imply 
If one accepts IR, and also accepts that it functions properly (or it is applicable) 
only in those cases where CPR is met, then one has to accept this also: that if a 
consideration can be recognized as reasonable through certain mental operations, it 
must be capable of motivating practically rational persons. This is what IR implies. 
IR doesn't imply that nothing can interrupt the motivational transmission. In many 
ways, the second capacity contributing to practical rationality can be blocked. 
Someone can understand what is reasonable for him to do after performing certain 
rational mental operations, but not be motivated to act accordingly. In this way, the 
motivational influence of the recognized rational consideration - which is reached by 
certain rational mental operations - is interfered with. What are the possible factors 
which can interrupt the motivational transmission? For example, violent anger, 
depression, distraction, great sadness or sorrow, physical or mental illness. These 
factors can stop the agent from acting rationally - specifically, being able "to be 
motivationally responsive to the rational considerations available to [him]" 
(Korsgaard 1986: 13). 
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A. Compellingness of rational considerations 
"The necessity, or the compellingness, of rational considerations lies in those 
considerations themselves, not in us" (Korsgaard 1986: 13-4) . Whether or not there 
is a reason for someone to act in a certain way under a certain condition has to be 
judged by the capacity of reason. It is a matter of rational mental operations. The 
compellingness or the convincingness lies in the rational considerations themselves, 
and it is perceived or recognized by the capacity of reason. Whether or not persons 
with the rational considerations available to them will be motivated is a matter of 
empirical conditions. To see whether or not these persons are capable of allowing 
smooth motivational transmission, we have to "observe" whether there are 
significant factors which may block the transmission. In short, even though the 
rational considerations which are available to us are compelling, it does not imply 
that we will necessarily be motivated. 
Let's recall Korsgaard's characterization of CPR. To be practically rational, one 
has to be capable of two tasks: (1) performing certain rational mental operations 
through which one can recognize what the capacity of reason judges to be reasonable 
for one to do; and (2) allowing the motivational force to be transmitted along the 
paths laid out by the mental operations. These two tasks are the necessary and 
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conditions for being practically rational. Now we discover that the second part 
contributing to the condition of being "fully" practically rational may be interrupted 
by some empirically significant factors. This doesn't imply that rational 
considerations are not capable of motivating persons. It just reminds us that there are 
limitations on the "empirical effectiveness” of the second part. For the second part to 
function practically, the agent must be free of distorting factors which may block 
motivational transmission. 
Hence Korsgaard says, "to put the [above] point more properly ... [the] necessity 
[of the rational considerations] may lie in the fact that, when they do move us [who 
are free of some distorting factors] - either in the realm of conviction [in which the 
faculty of reason function] or in that of [our] motivation - they move us with the 
force of necessity，’ (1986: 14). The reason (1) why these rational considerations are 
capable of convincing us (in the realm of ideas) and the reason (2) why they are 
capable of moving us (in our motivation) are the same, that is, it is because the 
necessity or the compellingness lies in the rational considerations themselves. But 
this does not entail that in every case, they necessarily move us in the realm of ideas 
and/ or in our motivation. For whether or not can they move us depends on some 
relevant empirical conditions, for example, whether the person has enough 
intelligence and knowledge of human beings or history, or whether the person is free 
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of distorting factors that may block the motivational transmission. We can imagine 
that a person may deceive herself willfully and choose means insufficient to her end, 
even though sufficient means are at hand. She may do so because of some mental or 
psychological illness. Instead of claiming that the rational considerations available to 
her are not convincing or compelling, we should say that she is incapable of being 
practically rational, or her capacity to be practically rational is not functioning 
normally. Kosgaard says, "for all that is necessary for the reason claim to be is that 
we can say that, if a person did know and 'if nothing were interfering with her 
rationality,' she would respond accordingly" (1986: footnote 9). 
B. Unity between theoretical and practical reason 
We may see unity between theoretical reason and practical reason from two 
aspects. First, like CPR, the condition of being theoretically rational (hereinafter CTR) 
involves two components: (1) that of being capable of performing deductive and 
inductive reasoning; and (2) that of being capable of being appropriately convinced 
by them. Consider an example given by Korsgaard (1986: 14). If I am performing a 
piece of deductive reasoning, my conviction in the premises must carry through to a 
conviction in the conclusion. Second, good arguments are capable of convincing us -
if nothing is interfering with our rationality (or CTR) just like good reasons for action 
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are capable of moving us - if nothing is blocking our CPR. There are many factors 
that might make someone to fail to be persuaded by a good argument. 
Suppose CTR is similar to CPR formally. And good arguments can convince but 
not every time just like good reasons for action can motivate but not always. They 
can convince or motivate only if CTR or CPR are fulfilled. So what can we conclude 
from the above discussion? 
C. Conclusion of this section 
To conclude, as Korsgaard (1986: 15) says, theoretically, for an argument to be a 
good one, or, practically, for (a consideration processed by) a deliberation to earn the 
status of (a) reason, it must be capable of convincing or motivating a person when his 
rationality is not being interfered with. It does not entail that it must in every case be 
capable of convincing or moving any particular person. When we observe that a 
particular person has not been motivated by a rational consideration available to him, 
we cannot directly draw the conclusion that practical reason alone is motivationally 
inert. We have to find out if his rationality is being interfered with. If his rationality 
has not been interfered with, we have to reconsider whether or not the consideration 
in question can really be justified. 
By the above analysis, we can see the sphere of influence of IR. IR is applicable to 
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people whose rationality is functioning normally. By this requirement itself, it 
doesn't follow that a theoretical argument or a practical deliberation in every case 
can motivate any given individual. Some people may have a false understanding of 
the functioning of IR. They hold that if there are really any theoretical or practical 
reasons, they must be in every case capable of motivating people. Since they find out 
that in some cases, some people are not motivated, they draw the conclusion that 
practical reason alone cannot motivate. 
V. Motivational Skepticism Assumes Content Skepticism 
Before we proceed to see how Korsgaard argues against WI, I want to sum up her 
arguments as I've presented them in the previous three sections. She has argued that: 
1. If there is practical reason, it must be capable of motivating rational persons. This 
is IR. 
2. IR functions properly in those cases where CPR is met. This condition has two 
parts, first, being capable of performing certain rational mental operations, 
through which a person is able to recognize rational considerations; second, 
being capable of letting the motivational force entailed in the compellingness of 
the rational considerations be transmitted to the person's motivation, so that she/ 
he will act accordingly. 
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3. CPR involves two capacities. These capacities may not function smoothly in 
every case. Sometimes, they may be blocked. A rational consideration is 
motivationally effective for people whose rationality isn't interfered with. If a 
rational consideration is capable of motivating people, it is because of its rational 
authority (or compellingness). If sometimes it cannot motivate a particular 
individual, this may be because of an interruption in the normal functioning of 
his rationality. 
The way Korsgaard argues against WI can be summed up as follows. First, through 
contrasting Hume's view on prudence and hers, she argues that a person's view on 
whether a candidate rational consideration can motivate or not depends on his 
already accepted view of what is to be included in the scope of practical reason. WI is 
a form of motivational skepticism (henceforth MS), which claims that reason (or a 
rational consideration) alone is motivationally impotent. MS draws support from an 
observation that a candidate norm might not govern conduct even when someone 
understood it. MS assumes content skepticism (hereafter CS) - being skeptical about 
the appropriateness of accepting the candidate norm as a reason for action. However, 
CS is controversial, and hence the convincingness of MS is weakened. Korsgaard's 
argument proceeds as follows. 
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A. Hume on prudence 
There is a "general appetite to good and aversion to evil" (Hume 1739/40: 
2.3.3.8).^ If this general passion remains dominant over other passions, a person will 
act prudently. For it is under the influence of this end that he weighs one possible 
satisfaction against another, finding out the one constitutes to his greater good, and 
acts accordingly. However, so long as this general passion does not keep its ruling 
status, the reason and the motive for him to do what will constitute his greater good 
disappears. Hume says, “It is as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own 
acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the 
former than the latter’’ (1739/40: 2.3.3.6; cf. Korsgaard 1986: 15). 
B. Korsgaard's example 
According to Korsgaard, CPR involves two capacities. Whenever the two 
capacities function properly in a person, she is fully rational. Whenever any one of 
the two capacities is blocked or distorted - accidentally or deliberately - she is not 
practically rational. 
Korsgaard gives the following example: Imagine that you have to choose among 
two options, action x - which will enhance your well-being, or action y - which will 
6 When I quote Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, I will specify the source by indicating from 
which book, which part, which section, and which paragraph the quotation comes. For example, the 
abbreviation 2.3.1.2 stands for book 2，part 3，section 1，paragraph 2. 
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lead to your lesser good. Suppose you choose 少 instead of jc. Also, suppose you are 
not failing to be practically rational, in the sense that you haven't deliberately or 
willfully chosen means insufficient to your end, or that you haven't failed to respond 
appropriately to the available reasons (or means to end). What will be the possible 
interpretation of your decision? There are at least two. 
Here is the first interpretation. Since you have chosen 少’ which would lead to your 
lesser good, this may imply that "you didn't want" to enhance your well-being, or the 
enhancement of your well-being was not the most important thing “to you", or "you 
wanted to" have an experience of acting against your greater good. If we explain 
your choice in this way, we assume an instrumentalist conception of practical reason. 
According to this view, what you have reason to do depends on whether the 
suggested action can fulfill your end, desire, or preference. Also, we assume that the 
enhancement of your well-being is merely one of the possible ends you might care 
about or not. The point is: whether a possible end can move you to act in a certain 
way depends on whether it is the end "you really want," or care about, given that 
there are no other ends which are more important than it, or it is not in conflict with 
your other equally important ends. Relative to your end, if you have chosen sufficient 
means, we have no reason to say that you are not deliberating or acting rationally.^ 
7 Compare with Hume 1739/40: 2.3.3.6. 
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Second, we may disagree with the first interpretation. We have reason to say, even 
though you didn't want to enhance your well-being, or the enhancement of your 
well-being was not the most important thing to you, so on and so forth, you are not 
practically rational. Before we say exactly how we disagree with the first 
interpretation, let's say how we agree with it. We don't deny that instrumental 
reasoning can be one form of practical reasoning. Also, we don't deny that one's ends, 
desires, or preferences contain motivational fuel. Where we disagree is in insisting 
that: though your choice or action is intelligible (or understandable) in a means/ end 
way, you are not practically rational. Prudence, or acting and deliberating in a way 
which may promote greater good, has rational authority. If one sees its rational 
authority, one will act accordingly. If one sees its compellingness, but one doesn't act 
accordingly, one is failing to be practically rational, for one has not responded to an 
available reason appropriately. Korsgaard (1986: 16) points out that “one might from 
some other cause fail to be responsive to a rational consideration," and if this is so, 
then there is no special or stronger reason to accept that the first interpretation must 
be true. People have reason to disagree with the first interpretation, for it is 
reasonable to choose the greater good, or, because prudence has rational authority. 
Even though someone may because of some other cause fail to be responsive to this 
rational consideration, it doesn't entail that this rational consideration is not 
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compelling, or motivationally ineffective. If this is so, then your choosing really 
indicates your failure to be practically rational. 
C. The point of her example 
What's the point of the above discussion? Korsgaard's point is that which 
interpretation you accept "depends on whether you ‘already，accept the limitation to 
means/ end rationality" (1986: 16). She thinks that if you already limit practical 
rationality to means/ end rationality, then you tend to accept the first interpretation 
and deny the second. If you think that - apart from instrumental reason - we have 
good reason to include prudence within the scope of practical reason, then you are 
likely to accept the second interpretation and suspend the convincingness of the first. 
Korsgaard says, "The point is that the motivational analysis of the case depends upon 
your views of the content of rational principles of action, not the reverse" (16). 
What's the implication of the above analysis? The empirical fact that one might or 
might not be motivated to choose an action which will lead to the greater good 
doesn't directly show that the consideration of promoting the greater good is merely 
one possible end, without special rational authority. Similarly, the empirical fact that 
one might or might not be motivated to choose a sufficient means to end does not 
directly show that taking available means to one's end is simply one option among 
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Others, without rational authority. Whether or not a consideration is rationally 
compelling, and thus capable of motivating rational people is one thing, and whether 
or not a particular individual may be motivated is another. For the former issue, it is a 
matter to be judged by the capacity of reason. For the latter issue, we have to observe 
whether the particular individual's rationality is interfered with. Korsgaard explicitly 
makes this point: "the fact that someone might fail to be motivated by the 
consideration that something will serve her greater good cannot by itself throw any 
doubt on the argument, whatever it is, that preferring the greater good is rational" 
(17). 
VI. A Humean Conception of Practical Reason 
Before I move on to show how Korsgaard argues against WFs interpretation of IR, 
I will tell how WI comes to its interpretation of IR. In this section, I will introduce a 
Humean conception of practical reason, which provides the platform for WFs 
interpretation of IR. 
A. Humean: practical reason claims are conditional in form 
What's a Humean view of the nature of practical reason claims? On the one hand, 
it is obvious that if there is practical reason, it must be capable of motivating persons. 
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On the other hand, it seems, at least for the Humeans and/ or the instrumentalists, 
that motivation is emerged from one's desires, passions, or preferences. These two 
claims are at first view beautifully matched - but perhaps not only - with an 
instrumentalist view of practical reasoning. The instrumentalists do not deny that 
reason can play a role in the genesis of action. Reason can help us to seek sufficient 
means for our ends, desires, and the like. The reason why we have a reason and also 
a motive to do a certain action lies in its sufficiency for fulfilling what we already 
want. The consideration that a certain action will promote a certain purpose provides 
us a reason and a motive to act accordingly, given that we already desire this purpose. 
Generally, the normative force as well as the motivational force of this consideration 
come from this pre-existing motivation, namely our desiring of the purpose. If what 
is analyzed here is correct, it seems that "it is a subjective matter which 
considerations can motivate a given individual and that, therefore, all judgements of 
practical reason must be conditional in form" (Korsgaard 1986: 19). 
B. Humean and/ or instrumentalist 
Must a Humean holds instrumentalism of practical reason? We need to complete 
two tasks if we want to answer this question. First, we have to clarify the limit of 
instrumental reasoning. Second, we have to understand what a Humean must hold 
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basically, and see if his basic doctrine necessarily entails an instrumentalist view of 
practical reason. Broadly, instrumental reasoning 一 apart from reasoning of causal 
relations of means to end - includes constitutive reasoning, i.e. finding out what are 
the constitutive elements for a certain end. Narrowly, instrumental reasoning includes 
only reasoning of causal relations, namely, seeking the means sufficient for achieving 
a certain end. Let's use instrumentalism in a broad sense. 
Second, we shall consider what the basic Humean doctrine is. A Humean does not 
disagree with CMI that practical reason must be capable of motivating persons. But it 
cannot be a basic Humean claim. For if a Humean takes this as his/ her basic belief, 
and CMI agrees with this belief, then it seems a Humean can't effectively distinguish 
itself from CMI. Humeanism disagrees with CMI about the source of motivation. 
While CMI holds that reason alone can motivate action, a Humean rejects it and 
holds that the spring of motivation lies in an agent's S, where we can find the agent's 
passions, desires, preferences, and the like. So, basically, a Humean's claim is of the 
source of motivation. 
Now, let's consider, if basically a Humean holds that (1) the only source of 
motivation is the agent's S, and he also accepts that (2) if there is practical reason, it 
must be capable of motivating persons, must he only accept an instrumentalist 
understanding of practical reasoning? It seems, following from these two basic 
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beliefs, he should hold something like that: through certain rational mental 
operations - perhaps not necessarily in an instrumentalist style - a consideration can 
offer the agent a reason and a motive to act in a certain way, only if these mental 
operations proceed from interests and motives the agent already has. In short, for a 
consideration - which is a product of certain rational mental operations - to be a 
reason and a motive for the agent to act in a certain way, it must proceed from the 
agent's S. Korsgaard's analysis of a Humean position echoes with mine, she says, 
"[for a Humean,] practical-reason claims must be reached by something that is 
recognizably a rational deliberative process from interests and motives one already 
has” (1986: 19). This Humean characterization of the criterion for being a reason for 
action does not obviously assume an instrumentalism of practical reason. 
The readers should be reminded that it is another question whether Hume is a 
Humean, or whether Hume is merely an instrumentalist. And we should be reminded 
that Williams is an instrumentalist in a broad sense (i.e. includes constitutive 
reasoning). Williams himself denies that he is an instrumentalist of practical reason. 
But I think he denies so in the sense of rejecting himself to be an instrumentalist in 
the narrow sense, but not in the broad sense. 
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C. Principle of desire-in, desire-out (PDIO) 
To recall, a Humean basically holds that for a consideration proceeding from 
certain rational mental operations to play a role as a reason for an agent to act in a 
certain way, it must draw its normative and motivational force from the agent's S. In 
a piece of reasoning, if a conclusion drawn from some premises can be normatively 
and motivationally influential on what an agent does, the basic premise(s) must have 
some normative fuel and motivational fuel drawn from the agent's S. We may extract 
Hume's view of the structure of a piece of practical reasoning from the following 
example: 
"[T]he ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be 
accounted by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the 
sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the 
intellectual faculties. Ask a man, why he uses exercise; he will answer, 
because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires 
health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your 
enquiries farther, and desire a reason, why he hates pain, it is impossible 
he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any 
other object" (1751: Appendix 1 paragraphlS). 
Let's reconstruct the above example into an argument form: 
PI Pain is to be avoided. (Or pain is "undesirable". This is rooted 
entirely in the "sentiments and affections" of mankind. Hence, this 
premise is "motivationally efective，，.） 
P2 Sickness is painful. 
PS One of the effective ways to avoid sickness is through maintaining/ 
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improving one's health. 
P4 Doing exercises probably will help maintaining/ improving one's 
health. 
Therefore 
C5 To avoid pain, one probably needs to do exercises. 
Given the major premise is motivating, the concluding judgement in turn would 
normally lead to acting accordingly. For the Humean, it is a hard fact that a piece of 
practical reasoning can be motivating only if it proceeds from something 
motivational in nature (cf. Audi 1989: 44 - 5). We may call this the principle of 
desire-in, desire-out^ and in a word, PDIO (cf. Wallace 1990). According to this 
principle, a piece of reasoning can generate a conclusion which is motivationally 
effective only if the reasoning proceeds from something motivational in nature. In 
short, motivational output comes from motivational input. This principle sounds 
intuitively attractive. To decide whether the Humean position is plausible and 
attractive, we need further investigation on the appealingness of this principle. I will 
discuss this in the next two chapters. 
VII. Korsgaard vs. Williams on the Proper Interpretation of IR 
Williams holds that only internal reasons exist. Internal reasons are, by definition, 
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reasons reached by deliberation proceeding from S} Internal reasons are capable of 
motivating us, for they are ultimately connected to S. Means/ end deliberation -
where the end comes from this set and the means are reached by deliberation 
motivated by this set - is the most typical, however not the sole, form of deliberation. 
Williams thinks that 
"there are [many forms of deliberation], such as: thinking how the 
satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by time ordering; 
where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S 
considering which one attaches most weigh to ... or ... finding 
constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an 
entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment" (1980: 104 — 
5). 
Basically, Williams accepts IR, and he thinks that IR should be concretized/ 
interpreted according to PDIO. He connects IR and PDIO in this way. If there is 
practical reason, it must be capable of motivating persons. According to PDIO, for 
certain rational mental operations to have motivational output, it must have 
motivational input. Something in us must make us capable of being motivated by 
some rational considerations (acknowledged by certain rational mental operations), 
and this something will be part of S (cf. Korsgaard 1986: 21). 
The dispute between Williams and Korsgaard concerning the proper interpretation 
of IR can be summed up in this way. Williams makes use of the above combined 
conception of IR and PDIO to argue against the plausibility of pure practical reasons 
8 One should be reminded that Williams's claim of the existence of internal reasons is different from 
CMFs view. Williams's claim is an interpretation of IR which is different from CAf/'s one. 
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(cf. Korsgaard 21). But Korsgaard thinks that PDIO doesn't follow from IR, and 
hence Williams's combined conception, or his interpretation of IR is inappropriate. 
She thinks what seems to follow from IR is this: 
if we can be motivated by considerations stemming from pure practical 
reason, then that capacity belongs to the subjective motivational set of 
every rational being (1986: 21). 
In what follows, I will present Korsgaard's arguments supporting her view. 
The first argument can be presented in this way. Korsgaard accepts IR, and she 
argues that IR can function properly only in the cases where CPR is met. That is to 
say, it is true to say that practical reason can motivate, but only in those cases where 
full rationality is met: that the persons are (1) capable of performing certain rational 
mental operations, and also (2) capable of allowing smooth transmission of the 
motivating power entailed in the compellingness of the rational considerations 
reached by the mental operations. The persons are not fully rational when any one of 
the two capacities is blocked or distorted accidentally or willfully. Hence, if an 
individual cannot be motivated by a suggested rational consideration, this doesn't 
directly imply that the candidate consideration loses its compellingness. Whether a 
consideration is compelling is to be judged through a certain rational mental 
operations. Whether a candidate can motivate a particular individual depends on 
whether she/ he is fully rational or not. The implication of the above analysis is: 
Simply by citing the fact that someone may on the one hand understand a candidate 
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rational consideration, and on the other hand may not be motivated, MS cannot argue 
that this candidate rational consideration does not have the status of a practical 
reason, with motivational force. 
The second argument goes like this. Williams challenges the existence of pure 
practical reason as follows. He claims that something in us must make us capable of 
being motivated by pure practical reason, and this something will be part of S. But 
pure practical reason, by definition, is independent of one's S, hence his definition 
already rules it out. 
Korsgaard has argued that a philosopher's view on whether a candidate rational 
consideration can motivate or not depends on her/ his already accepted view of what 
is to be included in the scope of practical reason, not the reverse. Williams's 
argument does not show that if there were unconditional principles of reason 
applying to action we could not be motivated by them. As long as it is left open what 
kinds of rational operations - and surely pure practical reason can be one of the 
candidates - yield conclusions about what to do and what to pursue, it must be left 
open whether we are capable of being motivated by them (Korsgaard 1986: 22). 
In this chapter I have explored Korsgaard's version of CMI- the thesis that 
cognitive appreciation of a reason for action can entail the agent has a motive to act 
accordingly. In other words, reason alone is motivationally effective. 
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As I pointed out in section VI C, the Humean thinks that it is a hard fact that a 
piece of practical reasoning can be motivationally effective only if it proceeds from 
something motivational in nature. I call this the principle of desire-in, desire-out, or 
PDIO. In the coming chapter, we will see how three types of Humeanism understand 
and argue for PDIO. I will be arguing that all of them fail to defend PDIO 
convincingly. 
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3 
Varieties of Humeanism: 
Arguments for the principle of desire-in, desire-out 
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" 
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat. 
"I don't much care where ~ said Alice. 
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat] 
Carroll 1866(1998): 87 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I am going to explore three Humean theories of motivation. As I 
pointed out in the previous chapter (§ VI，C), one basic Humean doctrine states that a 
piece of practical reasoning has motivational potential only if it proceeds from 
something motivational in nature. I call this the principle of desire-in, desire-out, or 
PDIO. Different streams of Humeanism disagree on how - in detail 一 desire, reason, and 
motivation are connected, and thus how - in detail - we should understand PDIO. 
Nonetheless, they all agree that desire plays a prominent role in giving rise to the 
motivational efficacy of reasoning. In this chapter, we will see how three streams of 
Humeanism understand and argue for PDIO. I will argue that they fail to defend PDIO 
successfully. 
‘This dialogue between Alice and the Cat in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1866) vividly captures 
the spirit of a Humean view of motivation, I saw part of this dialogue in Fumerton's Reason and Morality 
(1990). Fumerton's mentioning of part of this dialogue stimulated me to use it here. 
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A. The motivational question 
What is the central question to be dealt with by theories of motivation in practical 
reasoning? The question can be stated in this way. What makes practical reasoning 
capable of motivating an agent to intend to act in accordance with the reasoning's 
conclusion? (We may call this "the motivational question.") Theories of motivation in 
practical reasoning aim to explain the motivational effectiveness of practical reasoning. 
The motivational power of practical reasoning can be defined as the capacity of 
reasoning to motivate an agent to intend to act in accordance with the reasoning's 
conclusion. The focus of this thesis is the plausibility of different explanations of the 
motivational force of practical reasoning. What does Humeanism say in response to the 
motivational question? 
B. Central thesis of Humeanism in general 
The central thesis of Humeanism can be put as follows. In explaining the motivational 
power of practical reasoning, desires (or affective/ sentimental states) play a central role. 
Specifically, Humeanism holds that an agent's intention or desire to follow the 
conclusion of a piece of reasoning must come from a certain desire input. The output of 
intending or desiring in accordance with the reasoning's conclusion must have an input. 
This is the Humean principle of desire-in, desire-out.^ In this chapter, we will see how 
different varieties of Humeanism understand and argue for PDIO? 
2 The notion of the principle of desire-in, desire-out is suggested by Wallace (1990). 
3 We should note that some philosophers - for examples, Nagel (1970)，Korsgaard (1986) and Wallace 
(1990) - do on the one hand hold some versions of weak sense comprehensive rationalism of motivation, 
and on the other hand implicitly or explicitly embrace PDIO. Weak sense comprehensive rationalism 
holds that evaluative beliefs - beliefs about what it would be best or good enough to do - must be 
supplemented by desires in motivating an agent. However, the relevant desires can themselves be 
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C. Different types of Humeanism 
Based on the scope of practical reasoning which a theory of motivation tries to 
account for, we can classify it either as a comprehensive or a non-comprehensive theory. 
A comprehensive theory aims to explain the functioning of practical reasoning in 
general. A non-comprehensive theory attempts to account for the functioning of some 
sorts of practical reasoning. 
The cognitivists and the Humeans embrace their own central (or basic) claims (or 
doctrines) - the claims that make them belong to one group but not the opposite. 
Different cognitivists or Humeans can argue for their central claims in different degree 
of strength. Based on the degree of strength of the central claims being argued for，we 
can further divide comprehensive and non-comprehensive theories into strong (or radical) 
and weak (or moderate) ones. 
In the case of Humeanism, we can divide different Humean theories into 
comprehensive or non-comprehensive ones. Comprehensive Humeanism tries to offer 
explanation of the functioning of practical reasoning in general while non-
comprehensive Humeanism attempts to explain the functioning of a certain sort of 
practical reasoning. Under each group, there are two sub-groups: the strong sense and 
the weak sense/ A Humean argues for the claim that desire alone contributes to the 
motivating power of practical reasoning is classified as a strong or a radical Humean. A 
generated by evaluative beliefs. It is a crucial and an interesting question whether PDIO is compatible 
with weak sense comprehensive rationalism. For more on this discussion, one may refer to Wallace (1990). 
4 My idea of splitting Humeanism into comprehensive and non-comprehensive, and then into strong sense 
and weak sense is stimulated by Shafer-Landau's work (2003). Shafer-Landau doesn't divide Humeanism 
into these four species. I find that my classification of Humeanism is useful when we discuss different 
alternatives in response to motivational problem(s) in practical reasoning. This classification allows us to 
discuss motivational problem(s) in a more specific way. 
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Humean argues for the claim that desire contributes at least partly to the motivational 
efficacy of practical reasoning is qualified as a weak or a moderate Humean. 
In short, Humean theories of motivation can be classified according to two principles. 
First, the scope of practical reasoning which a Humean theory tries to explain. Second, 
the degree of strength of the central Humean claims the theory tries to defend. We can 
draw a table to illustrate the classification of Humeanism based on these two principles. 
The following is an example. In this chapter, I will focus mainly on the comprehensive 
alternatives. 
I ！ Strong sense: the motivational i Examples: Bald i Challenges: i 
i i power of practical reasoning is i instrumentalism (some ； Motivational power i 
I /jN I completely contributed by an ； interpretations of Hume), ； of non-teleological j 
； .3 i agent's desires ； Argument from direction of ； or non-means-end ； 
i o i i fit (e.g. Anscombe [1957], i reasoning, Pure i 
I I I i Platts [1979], Smith [1987]), j cognitivism (e.g. i 
； 3 ； ； and perhaps Williams's | Dancy[1993]) ； 
i -a 丨 丨（1980) intemalism 丨 i i g 另 丨 i 丨 i ： 民 i �-—— i ； ； g tg ； Weak sense: the motivational ； Example: Partial Humeanism ； Pure cognitivism ； 
i 与 c/5 i efficacy of practical reasoning ; (e.g. Mele [2003]) 丨（e.g. Dancy) i 
i ^ B ！ is at least partly contributed by ： ； | 
i I ；S 丨 certain kind of an agent's 丨 丨 i 
i � 一 ; antecedent desires i \ ； 
i ^ i Strong sense: the motivational ； Example: instrumental ； Challenge: ； 
i : power of practical reasoning is i reasoning i Korsgaard's ( 1 9 8 6 ) : 
i g j completely contributed by an ： ： version of I 
；(o Oh I agent's desires | ； cognitivist ； 
i "I ^ i i i motivational ； 
i ^ "g i _i i intemalism i 
i 一 i Weak sense: the motivational ； Example: (Non- | ； 
i 日！浮 i efficacy of practical reasoning ： comprehensive) Partial ； i 
i o ^ "I i is at least partly contributed by i Humeanism i i 
； o "g g ： certain kind of an agent's ； ； ； 
\ ^ ^ \ antecedent desires i i i 
Table 1: A Classification of Humean Theories of Motivation 
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II. Comprehensive Humeanism: An overview 
A. Central claims of strong comprehensive Humeanism 
Strong comprehensive Humeanism claims that the motivational force of practical 
reasoning derives completely from an agent's (antecedent) desires. When an agent is 
convinced - through a process of reasoning - that he has reason to (p (where "(p" is a 
variable for prospective courses of action), and thus he is motivated to intend to (p, his 
motivation to intend to (p is completely contributed by his (antecedent) desires. 
Concerning the role of evaluative beliefs in motivation, strong comprehensive 
Humeanism makes two claims. The first is a negative claim, that evaluative beliefs (in 
moral or non-moral cases) are not motivating by themselves. More accurately, cognitive 
appreciation of evaluative beliefs alone is motivationally inert. The second claim is a 
positive one, that evaluative beliefs are motivating only if they are combined with the 
agent's desires (or affective^/ sentimental^ states). 
B. A sketch of varieties of comprehensive Humeanism 
There are at least two sorts of strong comprehensive Humeanism. On the one hand, 
there is bald instrumentalism. It contends that reasoning generates motivation in us only 
through identifying means to "antecedent desired ends" (Mele 2003: 89)7 On the other 
hand, there is the argument from direction of fit.^ 
5 We may take an affective state as something "of, pertaining to, or characterized by feelings or affects" 
(OED Online) or as something "of or pertaining to the affections or emotions" (OED Online). 
6 We may conceive a sentimental state as "what one feels with regard to something; mental attitude (of 
approval or disapproval, etc.)" (OED Online). 
7 Bald instrumentalism can be extracted from Hume, and can be found in some interpretations of Hume. 
Certainly, it is debatable whether or not Hume's theory of motivation is identical with bald 
instrumentalism. To have a fair answer, we need to do some Hume studies. In my thesis, I don't aim at 
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The first conception - bald instrumentalism 一 claims that reason alone is 
motivationally impotent. The role of reason is to identify available means to what the 
agent already desires. The motivational fuel comes from the agent's desire. This 
conception has two presuppositions. First is that the scope of practical reason includes 
instrumental reasoning only. Second, that what is motivationally effective lies only in 
the agent's desires. Both presuppositions are controversial. The Humeans owe us an 
argument for why it is the case that desires play an active role in making a piece of 
reasoning motivating. Moreover, they need to explain how it is the case that someone's 
having a reason to do something can be captured by a Humean picture in general, but not 
restricted to an instrumentalist picture of practical reasoning. 
The second conception - argument from direction of fit - aims to show that desires 
play an active role in making a piece of reasoning motivating. This claim is not 
restricted to cases of instrumental reasoning, but practical reasoning in general. In other 
words, this argument aims to show the essential connection between desire and 
motivation in practical reasoning. The first and the second conceptions belong to strong 
digging out what Hume says and what he doesn't say, or what Hume's theory of motivation is. What I 
would like to do is, to recall, to clarify the motivational problem, to consider different alternatives in 
response to this problem, and to assess their plausibility. I don't target on any specific theories of 
motivation proposed by any particular philosophers. Rather, I consider the alternatives in response to the 
problem in general. 
From time to time, it is said that Hume claims that reasons or beliefs alone are incapable of motivating 
an agent. Reasons and beliefs have to be combined with passions or desires in order to motivate an agent. 
Hence, the active power of motivating an agent lies in an agent's passions or desires. However, it is 
complained that Hume himself doesn't explain clearly why it is the case that passions or desires play the 
active role in motivating an agent. Anscombe (1957) offers the concept of direction of fit to explain the 
beliefs-desires distinction; she tries to explain how beliefs are conceived as non-active while desires are 
conceived as active. The argument is further developed by Platts (1979), and then Smith (1987). This line 
of argument is discussed and criticized in Platts (1979)，Dancy (2000) and Shafer-Landau (2003). 
There can be different versions of direction-of-fit argument. The version I am going to discussed is 
presented by Smith (1987). By exploring Smith's version of direction-of-fit argument, I don't mean that 
this sort of argument can support a Humean position only. Some rationalists take this approach too. What 
I attempt to suggest is this. Some versions of direction-of-fit argument can be employed to support a 
strong comprehensive Humeanism. I thank Prof. Hsu Hahn for pushing me to make this clarification. 
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comprehensive Humeanism. The claims of these two conceptions are strong and hence 
are more likely to be challenged. 
Another conception tries a more modest claim. It claims that a certain sort of desire 
constitutes at least partly the motivational efficacy of reasoning. I dub any Humean 
theory supporting this restricted claim partial Humeanism (or PH)’ which is a sort of 
weak comprehensive Humeanism. It is debatable whether this restricted claim 
contradicts some moderate versions of rationalism. Some moderate rationalists welcome 
this claim. 
Generally, there are two lines of thought in characterizing or arguing for PDIO. On 
the one hand, some Humeans try to characterize or argue for PDIO in a "linear" way. 
Other Humeans attempt to characterize or argue for PDIO in a "two-level" way. In the 
former approach, it is argued or conceived that the presence of an antecedent desire is a 
necessary input for practical reasoning to generate an output-desire to act in accordance 
with the reasoning's conclusion. The input of desire, the process of practical reasoning, 
and the output of desire are connected in a linear way. In the latter picture, it is argued 
that a desire is always present in the "background" of practical reasoning. Whether 
desire is always present in the "foreground" - the content of practical reasoning -
depends on the type of reasoning in which the agent is engaged. The presence of a 
background desire "enables" the reasons for action figured in the foreground (or content) 
of practical reasoning to take effect. I will return to this two-level way of characterizing 
or arguing for PDIO in the next chapter. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will 
first of all discuss bald instrumentalism, then argument from direction of fit, and then 
PH. These three sorts of Humeanism characterize or argue for PDIO in a linear way. 
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III. Bald Instrumentalism 
In this section, I will discuss bald instrumentalism. It claims that reasoning generates 
motivation in us only through identifying means to "antecedent desired ends" (Mele 
2003: 89). In other words, reasoning does not have independent motivating force. What 
reason informs the agent about has practical worth to the agent only if he has a prior 
interest in it or served by it. 
Bald instrumentalism is often associated with a Humean conception of practical 
reasoning. Perhaps Hume himself is not purely an instrumentalist concerning practical 
reasoning. But clearly, Hume's works, especially A Treatise of Human Nature (1739 -
40) (hereafter THN), offer fruitful resources for constructing an instrumentalist view. 
A. Demonstrative reasoning 
There are two kinds of reasoning, demonstrative and probabilistic. By demonstrative 
reasoning, I mean a form of reasoning, specifically one in which the conclusion followed 
from axiomatic or established premises.^ Let's consider a piece of demonstrative 
reasoning. Suppose someone argues as follows. There is a plain reason for us to avoid 
causing unnecessary pain. Other factors kept constant, we should avoid killing animals 
which are capable of experiencing pain. Therefore, we should stop eating the meat of 
these animals. As shown by this example, by employing demonstrative reasoning, we 
are able to draw some conclusions with practical implications from some well-founded 
9 In contemporary usage, a demonstration is a logically valid proof from axioms or other established 
premises (Blackburn 1996: 98). However, this is not the usage in the period between Descartes (1596 -
1650) and J.S. Mill (1806 - 73). When David Hume (1711 - 76) talked about demonstrative reasoning, he 
probably referred to "a chain of 'intuitive' comparisons of ideas, whereby a principle or maxim can be 
established by reason alone" (Blackburn 98). In this section, I follow the contemporary usage. 
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premises. Let's consider another example. Mathematics or physics are employed when 
an engineer wants to work out a plausible blueprint of a space museum. Through making 
use of mathematical or physical knowledge, the engineer is able to calculate under 
which magnitude of an earthquake the museum cannot stand. In this way, demonstrative 
reasoning is being applied with some designed end or purpose. 
Through demonstrative reasoning, we are able to make some implicit conclusions 
explicit. Even if the conclusions have practical implications - telling us what we should 
do under certain circumstances - still they themselves are incapable of motivating us. 
Without a desired end (as in the example of meat-eating), or some designed end (as in 
the example of space museum), a piece of demonstrative reasoning is practically idle, in 
the sense of being unable to motivate a person to act in a certain way. It is impossible to 
convince a person to follow the conclusion in the example of meat-eating if the person 
doesn't care about the prospects of pain or pleasure of different animals. The gap 
between the conclusion and the person's intention to act accordingly can only be bridged 
by his caring about these ends. 
B. Probabilistic reasoning 
Another type of reasoning is probabilistic reasoning. Probabilistic reasoning deals 
with connections between matters of fact. It can inform us of causes and effects of 
events. Through probabilistic reasoning, we are able to figure out which course of action 
(conceived as causes of some effects) is more likely to bring about a particular end 
(conceived as the effects brought about by some causes). Let's consider an example to 
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see how probabilistic reasoning contributes to the production of action (or avoidance of 
doing something). Hume offers the following example: 
"Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but 
custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the 
appearance of one to the existence of another. ... A person, who stops short in his 
journey upon meeting a river in his way, foresees the consequences of his proceeding 
forward; and his knowledge of these consequences is conveyed to him by past 
experience, which informs him of such certain conjunctions of causes and effects. But 
can we think, that on this occasion he reflects on any past experience, and calls to 
remembrance instances, that he has seen or heard of, in order to discover the effects of 
water on animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method, in which he proceeds his 
reasoning. The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of water, and the idea of 
suffocating with that of sinking, that the mind makes the transition without the 
assistance of the memory. The custom operates before we have time for reflection" 
(THN 1.3.8.12-13)1�. 
There is a piece of practical reasoning. The minor premise is: if one enters into a river, 
very likely one will sink. This piece of thought is rooted in custom. What about the 
major premise? According to Hume, reason's role lies in discovering truth or falsehood 
and seeking available means to given ends. Reason alone is "perfectly inert" (THN 
3.1.1.8). So, the major premise must be something of desire (or aversion, i.e. wanting to 
avoid something). In Hume's example, since the agent wants to avoid suffocating, the 
major premise may be put as: suffocating is to be avoided. So, the whole piece of 
practical reasoning can be formulated in this way: Suffocating is to be avoided. If I enter 
into this river, I probably will sink and then will be suffocated. Therefore, I shall avoid 
entering into the river. 
The agent informed with this information of causes and effects 一 that if one enters into 
a river, one probably will sink and then will be suffocated - will not be motivated to act 
accordingly if he has no relevant antecedent desire, in this case wanting to avoid 
10 ‘THN，stands for Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739 - 40)，designated by book number, part 
number, section number, and paragraph number. For example, '1. 3. 8.12' refers to Book 1, Part 3, 
Section 8，Paragraph 12. 
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suffocating. That is to say, this piece of information will be practically useftil for him 
only if he has a prior interest. 
C. Two unanswered questions of bald instrumentalism 
Bald instrumentalism suggests that both demonstrative and probabilistic reasoning do 
not have independent motivating force. What these two forms of reasoning inform the 
agent would be practically worth to the agent only if he has a prior interest in them. 
Bald instrumentalism depends on two presuppositions. First, that the scope of 
practical reasoning includes instrumental reasoning only. Second, that what is 
motivationally effective lies only in the agent's desires. Both presuppositions are 
contentious. The Humeans owe us an argument for why it is the case that desires play an 
active role in making a piece of reasoning motivating. Also, the Humeans need to 
explain how it is the case that someone's having a reason to do something can be 
captured by a Humean picture in general, even in cases in which the agent's reasoning is 
not only instrumental but concerns her ends. 
Another Humean view - argument from direction of fit 一 aims to show that desires 
play an active role in making a piece of reasoning motivating. This claim is not 
restricted to cases of instrumental reasoning, but practical reasoning in general. In other 
words, the second argument aims to show the essential connection between desire and 
motivation in practical reasoning. 
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IV. Argument from Direction of Fit 
A. Its purpose and its steps 
Strong comprehensive Humeanism claims that it is desire which plays an active role 
in motivating an agent to intend in accordance with the conclusion of a piece of 
reasoning. How can we understand the active role of desire? The argument from 
direction of fit aims at explaining the essential connection between desire and 
motivation in practical reasoning. More explicitly, this line of argument aims to make 
sense of the active role of desire in the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning. 
Smith (1987: 51) explicitly points out that the idea (borrowed from Anscombe [1957] 
and Platts [1979]) that desires are states with which the world must fit can be employed 
to make sense of a Humean view of the essential connection between our concepts of 
desire and motivation. 
This line of argument can be divided into two steps: first, taking desires as states with 
which the world must fit; and second, connecting desire and motivation in practical 
reasoning.il Let's begin with the first step. 
B. Desires: States with which the world must fit 
In explaining the motivational force of practical reasoning, some forms of 
Humeanism uphold these two claims: first, that desires are necessary for motivation, and 
second, that desires are states with some feelings and often imply some intention or aim 
“In constructing this line of argument, my greatest debts are to Smith (1987). 
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{Merriam- Webster 2002; see also OED Online, Ed.)/: These forms of Humeanism 
embrace a phenomenological conception of desire. Ordinarily - but not in all cases - our 
desires appear on our mental scene, and often move us to act in a certain way. However, 
there are two sorts of typical examples which raise serious challenges to any forms of 
Humeanism married to a phenomenological conception of desire. First, someone can be 
motivated to cp (where "(p" is a variable for prospective courses of action) "because" he 
thinks that "it is right" to (p, even though he doesn't desire (or want) to cp.^ ^ Second, 
there are cases in which a person has a certain desire to (p without the presence of any 
(distinct) feeling on his mental scene. 
Humeanism of any variety is typically criticized for upholding a phenomenological 
conception of desire. Must Humeanism uphold a phenomenological conception of 
desires? Can Humeanism uphold a more plausible conception of desire? In this part, I 
will first, point out the implausibility of a phenomenological conception of desire, and 
then, point to a more plausible conception of desire which can be embraced by most if 
not all forms of Humeanism. 
a. A naive phenomenological conception of desire 
A naive phenomenological conception of desire models desire on sensations. This 
conception of desire holds that a subject desires to (p if and only if he believes that he 
12 The second claim fits with one of the common-sense understandings of the concept desire. Desire (OED 
Online, 2"'' Ed.) is defined as "[t]he fact or condition of desiring; that feeling or emotion which is directed 
to the attainment or possession of some object from which pleasure or satisfaction is expected; longing, 
craving; a particular instance of this feeling, a wish." 
13 For example, I don't want to go to school today, for I want to stay at home and take more rest. However, 
I have to hold a tutorial class on metaphysics in the afternoon. Recognizing that it is my duty to hold the 
tutorial class, I have to go to school, even though I don't want to do so. 
14 For instance, after deliberation, I want to finish my master thesis within this academic year. I have this 
want, though I don't have any feelings of it. It is simply strange to say that I do not have this want if I 
don't have any feelings about it. 
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desires to cp, just as a subject is in pain if and only if he is conscious that he is in pain. (cf. 
Smith 1987: 45) 
b. Two objections to the naive phenomenological conception 
Objection 1: The infallibility problem 
If after all a plausible conception of desire must be modeled on sensations, then we 
should accept that a subject desires to (p if and only if he believes that he desires to (p. 
This is supposed to express a necessary truth. According to this truth, we are infallible 
about what we desire. But this is simply false” There are many counterexamples, and I 
will offer two in what follows. 
Let's consider the first example. Paul notices that Peter always feels nervous 
whenever he meets Mary. He always avoids direct eye contact with her, and he seldom 
talks to her. Paul - being Peter's friend for several years - knows that he is quite 
talkative and doesn't feel nervous in front of other girls. Paul says, "Hey, Peter, you love 
Mary, don't you?" Peter shyly replies, "Of course not! I never mention this girl, she 
doesn't matter much for me ..." It is a common phenomenon that when someone falls in 
love, he may deny that he does so. It is plausible that he doesn't believe that this is so, 
given his, from his point of view, truthful denials. The point of this example is: it's 
plausible that someone has some sort of desire, though he does not believe that he has. 
The naive phenomenological conception of desires modeling on the sensation model is 
false. 
”This point is clearly pointed out by Smith (1987: 46). 
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Another typical counterexample goes like this. You are convinced or remember that 
there is a particular film that you want to watch in a film festival, though you aren't sure 
what exactly it is. Then, while scanning the film catalogue you suddenly, as we should 
put it, "realize what it was that you wanted all along.” This sort of example suggests that 
a subject may acknowledge that he desires something without knowing exactly what he 
desires. 
If we wish to respect the above two common sense examples, then we should give up 
the naive phenomenological conception of desires. Any conception of desires which 
respects our common sense observations should at least fulfill these two constraints: that 
(1) people may be fallible about the desires they have, and that (2) people may not know 
what exactly they desire even though they know they desire something in some 
occasions. 
Objection 2: Desire has content but not necessarily phenomenological 
Whenever someone has a certain desire, there must be the content of his desire, or 
what is desired. When we say that a person A desires that p, 'p' is the content of A's 
desire. 'P' may stand for a course of action (for achieving a certain goal), or a certain 
object, or a certain event. Desire has content. But the content is not necessarily 
phenomenological. In some cases, a person can desire that p with nothing to know about 
what it is like to desire that p.^ ^ In some other cases, a person's desire of something may 
be associated with a certain feelings. Even though in this sort of cases, a person can have 
16 For example, I want to borrow some books from library. 
Varieties of Humeanism 72 
this sort of desires without having a certain feelings, However, it is strange that a 
person is in pain without knowing what it is like to be in pain, or having a certain feeling. 
Hence, the naive conception which models desire on sensations is inappropriate in one 
sense that it is unable to take care of the fact that desire has content but not necessarily 
phenomenological. 
One obvious question is: Do we really believe that desires are states that have 
phenomenological content essentially? Our common sense tells us that we have no such 
belief. Let's consider an ordinary example. What we should usually think of as a long 
term desire; say, a student's desire that he can do his thesis well. An enthusiastic student 
may actually feel ‘Svhat it is like to be in this desire." Normally, we wouldn't think that 
he losses his desire when he lacks such feelings. To make the point of this sort of 
example explicit, whether or not one has a certain feeling is not the rule to determine 
whether or not one has a certain desire, especially some long term desires. Consider 
some daily and less interesting cases: I desire to go for a walk and do so, or I want to 
borrow some books from library and do so. In these daily examples, it is hard to believe 
that during the processes of doing what I want to do I am aware of a certain feelings 
driving me to do so. These actions, as Stroud (1977: 163) suggests, are indeed likely to 
be grouped under the model of cool, dispassionate action. What can we conclude from 
these daily examples? The presence of any feelings or the having of phenomenological 
content is not the rule for deciding whether one has a desire to do something (Smith 
1987: 48 - 9). 
口 For example, I desire to go for a walk. In some cases, a person's desire of going for a walk may be 
associated with a certain feeling. He may become less anxious, or feel relaxing so long as he has a desire 
for a walk. However, I may simply want to go for a walk without having this sort of feeling. 
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What lessons can we leam from the failure of the phenomenological conception of 
desire? We should think of another conception of desire which allows us to speak of 
having a desire without its being felt (cf. Smith 1987: 49). More accurately, we should 
consider an alternative which, on the one hand, allows us to talk of a desire, and on the 
other hand, does not make its being felt a necessary condition for deciding whether one 
has this desire. This alternative is important because many non-Humeans attack 
Humeans on the basis of the belief that any Humean conception of desire must be a 
phenomenological one. Non-Humeans argue that there can be motivation without a felt 
desire. But this objection counts against the Humean approach only if it is compulsory 
for Humeans to embrace a phenomenological conception of desire (cf. Smith 50). In 
what follows, we shall consider a non-phenomenological alternative. 
c. A dispositional conception of desires 
From the above discussion, an adequate conception of desire at least has to fulfill or 
account for these facts: 
1. Desire has content but not necessarily phenomenological. We can attribute desire to 
people without the presence of its being felt. Having phenomenological content is not 
necessary in desire attribution. 
2. A person can be wrong about his having a certain desire. Self-attribution of desire is 
fallible. Call this the fallibility requirement. 
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The idea of direction of fit 
Smith (1987) thinks that Platts (1979) outlines an alternative which is likely to fulfill 
the above requirements. Platts borrows insights from Anscombe (1957: § 2) and tries to 
make sense of the difference between beliefs and desires. Anscombe suggests a broad 
distinction between two sorts of mental states, namely factual beliefs and desires. The 
key to separate one sort of mental states from another lies in the distinction characterized 
in terms of the "direction of fit" of mental states with the world (Platts 1979: 256). Platts 
(256 一 7) continues, 
Beliefs aim at the true, and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is 
a decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded; beliefs 
should be changed to fit with the world, not vice versa. Desires aim at 
realization, and their realization is the world fitting with them; the fact that 
the indicative content of a desire is not realized in the world is not yet a 
failing in the desire, and not yet any reason to discard the desire; the world, 
crudely, should be changed to fit with our desires, not vice versa. 
Smith (1987: 51) thinks that the idea that desires are states with which the 
world must fit can be employed to make sense of a Humean view of the 
essential connection between our concepts of desires and motivation. Still, the 
idea of direction of fit encounters a problem. 
Platts points out that, if we follow the idea of direction of fit directly, it is doubtful 
whether it allows us to characterize desires (1979: 257). For example, I have a desire to 
invite a nice girl in my class to go to a jazz concert with me. My desire may involve 
elements of belief in the following way. The obtaining of the conditions in which I try to 
realize my desire may require that I have certain beliefs such as beliefs about what jazz 
music is, what a concert is, how to get the tickets of the jazz concert I am interested in 
and so on. If I notice (or it is pointed out to me) that any pieces of belief are false, they 
should be discarded. Beliefs should be changed to fit with what is really the case. This 
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example shows that desires involve elements of belief. Hence, Platts (1979: 257) says, 
"all desires appear to involve elements of belief," desires are not purely or merely states 
1 fi with which the world must fit. 
In what follows, I shall introduce a dispositional conception of desires, which 
incorporates the idea of direction of fit and, at the same time solves the above problem. 
A dispositional conception of desires 
We may state one common feature of many desires as follows. Desires can be 
conceived as dispositions to act in a certain ways under certain conditions. A subject's 
desire to (p can be conceived as a state of that subject that grounds all his relevant 
dispositions to (p under certain conditions such as the disposition to (p in conditions C, in 
conditions C'，and so on. But in order for condition C and C to obtain, he must have, 
among other things, certain beliefs/^ 
d. The pros and cons of the dispositional conception 
So what are the pros and cons of the dispositional conception? Though it has five 
advantages, it encounters one serious problem. I will begin with the five advantages 
(Smith 1987: 52-4) . 
First, the dispositional conception of desires can explain how it can be that desires 
have content. The content of a desire may be determined by the relevant set of 
dispositions to act in a certain ways under certain conditions. 
18 Platts (1979: 257) says, “I wish ... I were clearer as to whether there are any mental states for which the 
direction of fit is purely of the second kind; desires seem not to be such a candidate, since all desires 
appear to involve elements of belief." 
This is an outline of the dispositional conception of desires that Smith (1987: 52) proposes. 
Varieties of Humeanism 76 
Second, the dispositional conception also meets the fallibility requirement. A subject 
has a desire to cp. That means there is a set of dispositions to cp under certain conditions. 
Even this set of dispositions is true of this subject, it doesn't mean that he believes that it 
is the case. Similarly, a subject may believe that a set of dispositions is true of him; 
however, it doesn't mean that this set of dispositions is true of him. 
Third, the dispositional conception is consistent both with the claim that some desires 
have phenomenological content essentially and with the claim that some desires lack 
phenomenological content altogether. Some desires may be dispositions to have certain 
feelings under all conditions; these desires have phenomenological content essentially. 
Other desires, though they are dispositions to act in certain ways, may not be 
dispositions to have certain feelings at all; these desires lack phenomenological content 
altogether. 
Fourth, the dispositional conception is consistent with the claim that in many ways, 
desires involve elements of belief. If a subject's desire to (p is a set of dispositions to act 
in certain ways under certain conditions, then his desiring to cp may involve elements of 
belief in the following ways. The obtaining of the conditions in which he (ps may require 
that he has certain beliefs. Moreover, in determining whether the counterfactual "Were 
he in conditions C he would cp" is true or not, he has to be equipped with certain other 
beliefs due to holistic constraints on desire attribution. 
Fifth, the dispositional conception allows us to incorporate the idea of direction of fit, 
and thus draws support from it. The difference between beliefs and desires in terms of 
direction of fit can be restated as a difference between the counterfactual dependence of 
a belief and a desire that p on a perception that not p. The general idea goes like this. A 
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belief that p is a state that is not likely to endure in the presence of a perception that not 
p. A desire that p is a state that is likely to endure even in the presence of a perception 
that not p. A desire that p disposes a subject in that state to bring about that p. Hence, we 
may conclude that, attributions of beliefs and desires require that different kinds of 
counterfactuals be true of the subject to whom they are attributed. 
So much for the advantages of the dispositional conception of desire. Now for its 
defect: it is too broad. 
While the phenomenological conception of desire is too narrow, the dispositional too 
broad. If one accepts the phenomenological conception, one will exclude some cases in 
which we can attribute desire to people. It is because having phenomenological content 
is not a necessary condition in desire attribution. Though the dispositional conception 
avoids the problem of being too narrow, it cannot avoid the problem of being too broad. 
If one accepts the dispositional conception, one will include some cases in which desire 
attribution seems odd (if not false). If desire is conceived as disposition to act in a 
certain ways under certain conditions, then one will encounter oddity in desire 
attribution in the following example. Suppose you tell me p and p�q，then by my 
disposition, I naturally think that q. It is simply odd to say that I desire to infer q. Hence, 
the dispositional conception is too broad; it includes cases in which desire attributions 
are inappropriate.:� 
Suspending the problem of being too broad, the dispositional conception of desire is 
more plausible than the phenomenological one. But we have finished the first step of the 
argument from direction of fit. Rather, so far we have prepared a foundation for the 
1 thank Chris Fraser for this point. I owe him for another point which is stated as follows. If a Humean 
theory of motivation combines with the dispositional conception of desire, then this combination makes 
Humeanism trivially true. I will return to this point in section IV of the concluding chapter. 
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argument from direction of fit. In what follows, we shall see how the argument from 
direction of fit employs this conception of desire in establishing the Humean view of the 
essential connection between desires and motivation. 
C. Smith's argument connecting desire and motivation 
I shall first of all introduce an argument in support of the Humean claim that there is 
an essential connection between desire and motivation in practical reasoning. This line 
of argument is attempted by Smith (1987: 54 - 56). Following Smith's argument, I will 
consider five objections and replies. Here is the argument: 
PI If an agent has a reason to do a certain thing, she has a certain purpose or goal. 
P2 If she has a certain purpose or goal, she intends to bring about a certain state of 
affairs. 
P3 If she intends to bring about a certain state of affairs, then she is being in a state with 
a world-to-mind direction of fit, in the sense that if the world does not yet fit that 
state, then she will try to change the world to fit with it. (The fact that the content of 
the state is not realized in the world is not yet a failing in it, and not yet any reason to 
discard it; the agent will try to change the world to fit with it.) 
P4 Being in a state with a world-to-mind direction of fit is desiring. 
Therefore, 
C5/ P5 Having a reason to do a certain thing is, among other things, desiring. 
P6 If having a reason to do a certain thing is desire-laden, then it is natural that an agent 
can be motivated to intend in accordance with her reasons. 
Therefore, 
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C7 The motivational power of reasons (or practical reasoning) is constituted by (an 
agent's) desires. 
a. Two objections to P4 
I will start with some minor objections; the more serious ones will be discussed later. 
The first objection is targeted at P4. According to Platts (1979: 256) and Anscombe 
(1957: § 2)，desire is only "a prime exemplar" of those states with which the world must 
fit. Some may argue that there are other states that have this direction of fit as well, for 
instances, hopes, wishes, and the like (Smith 1987: 55). 21 Perhaps some Humeans may 
try to reduce or re-characterize these non-desire states into desire states. However, in 
doing so, they turn away from our common sense observations. 
The above criticism is about the details of the Humean's line of argument, not of the 
spirit of his argument. If desire is not a suitably large basket of mental states into which 
we put all of those states with the appropriate direction of fit, then the Humean may 
simply define the term ''pro-attitude" to mean "psychological state with which the world 
must fit," and then claim that the motivational power of reasons (or practical reasoning) 
is constituted by (an agent's) pro-attitudes. 
The second objection is also targeted at P4 (Smith 1987: 55 - 6). Some may challenge 
the assumption that there are only states with one or the other direction of fit. Why 
couldn't there be a state with both directions of fit; a state which is both such that the 
21 Having some normative beliefs such as "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them" 
(Matthew 7: 12) or "One should avoid causing unnecessary harm" involves at least partly aiming at 
realization, and their realization is the world fitting with them; the fact that the content of this sort of 
beliefs is not realized is not yet a failing in these beliefs, and not yet any reason to discard them. The 
world should be changed to fit with them. A person may be in the state of having this sort of beliefs 
without being in the state of desiring. Moreover, the person's having this sort of beliefs is in a state of 
world-to-mind direction of fit. Hence, the state of world-to-mind direction of fit is not necessarily a 
desiring state. 
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world must fit with it, and such that it must fit the world? Provided that such a two-
directional state were possible, it might be claimed, it could constitute the having of 
purpose or goal. But it would not be a desire, or a pro-attitude; for desires or pro-
attitudes are only one-directional. 
But the idea that there may be some two-directional states is incoherent (Smith 1987: 
56). According to our understanding of the concept of direction of fit, the direction of fit 
of a state with the content that p is determined, among other things, by its counterfactual 
dependence on a perception with the content that not p. What is it like to be in a state 
with both directions of fit? A state with both directions of fit would have to be such that 
both, in the presence of a perception with the content that not p it tends to go out of 
existence, and in the presence of such a perception, it tends to endure, disposing the 
subject that has it to bring it about that p. 
b. Objection 3: Motivated and unmotivated desires 
The third objection is directed at the Humean conception of desire. Let's call this line 
of objection “the confusion challenge.”之之 The challenge goes like this. The strong 
comprehensive Humean assumption that a desire underlies the motivational efficacy of 
every piece of practical reasoning depends, as some rationalists suggests, "on a 
confusion between two sorts of desires, motivated and unmotivated" (Nagel 1970: 29). 
What are motivated and unmotivated desires? 
Motivated desires can be defined as "desires that are arrived at by decision and after 
deliberation" (Nagel 29). For instance, I desire to (or more appropriately, I intend to) 
complete my thesis within this academic year. I have such desire because of several 
22 This line of challenge is developed by Nagel, in his The Possibility of Altruism (1970: ch. 5). 
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important considerations: I have to earn my living; the deadline of thesis is close, and so 
on. That I have such desire simply follows from the fact that these considerations 
motivate me. If considerations relevant to my completing of thesis can motivate by 
themselves, then they can explain and render intelligible the desire for completing thesis 
which is ascribable to anyone whom they do motivate (cf. Nagel 30). 
Unmotivated desires are "desires which simply come to us [and] they can be 
explained" (Nagel 29). For example, we want to have something to eat when we are 
hungry. Our desire for food is motivated by hunger. Hunger is caused by lack of food. 
Our desiring food is not motivated by our decision and after deliberation. We have such 
desire accidentally. 
If the above distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires is plausible, then 
the strong comprehensive Humean claim that a desire must form the basis of the 
motivational efficacy of every piece of reasoning is simply misleading because the 
Humean confuses unmotivated desires with motivated desires (cf. Nagel 31). In the 
cases of motivated desire, it is the considerations the agent takes to be relevant to what 
he should do that motivate him to (intend to) act in a certain way. In other words, the 
agent's motivation to act in a certain way is generated by something that is not a desire 
(or the agent's pre-existing desire). 
Reply to objection 3 
The strong comprehensive Humeans may respond to the confusion challenge by 
pointing out that there is confusion only if the idea of a desire motivated by a state that is 
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not a desire is itself plausible (Smith 1987: 58). The Humeans think that this idea is 
itself implausible. Their argument (cf. Smith 59) goes like this: 
(1) An agent's having a desire J is a motivated desire only if he has it for a reason r. 
(Let's assume that a motivated desire is, by definition, a desire had for a reason.24) 
(2) His having the reason r is constituted by his having a certain purpose or goal. (Recall 
PI: If an agent has a reason to do a certain thing, she has a certain purpose or goal.) 
(3) His having a certain purpose or goal is, in turn, the state that constitutes his having of 
the reason r. His having the desire d is because of his having the reason r. 
(4) If the state that motivates the desire (in this case, desire d) is itself a reason (in this 
case, reason r), and the having of this reason is itself constituted by a person's 
having a purpose or a goal, then, given that the having of a purpose or a goal is a 
state with a world-to-mind direction of fit (from P2 and P3), so it follows (from P4) 
that the state that motivates the desire (in this case, desire d) must itself be a desire. 
Therefore, 
(5) the idea that there may be a state that motivates a desire, but which is not itself a 
desire, is implausible. 
This Humean reply is acceptable only if (2) or PI is firmly established. But (2) or PI 
is open to dispute. It is not that evident why it must be the case that someone's having a 
reason to do a certain thing is constituted by her having a certain purpose or goal. In 
what follows, I will show an objection to PI. 
23 It seems that if the Humeans accept this plausibility, then they are giving up their core belief - PDIO. 
24 As Nagel (1970: 30) says, the desire in the case of motivated desire, is motivated by the considerations 
the agent takes to be relevant to what he should do. These considerations provide some prima facie 
reasons that the agent takes to be relevant to what he should do. Hence, a motivated desire is a desire had 
for some reason. 
Varieties of Humeanism 83 
c. Objection 4: Non-means-end reasoning 
PI is controversial. It is not that obvious why it must be the case that if an agent's 
having a reason to do a certain thing is constituted by her having a certain purpose or 
goal. In some non-means-end reasoning, what can motivate an agent can be a belief that 
an action is one's duty, that it is valuable, and so on. In these cases, (i) there is no 
statement of an end state (goal or purpose), and (ii) there is no implicit, entailed 
postulation of some sought-after state of affairs. In the cases of means-end reasoning or 
means-end reasons, the motivation being generated is quite naturally connected to an 
agent's desired ends, goals, or purposes. But it is not obvious that why it must be the 
case that any motivation generated - through reasoning - is explainable only in (or can 
be captured only by) a means-end model.^ ^ 
PI assumes another claim that the scope of practical reason (or reasoning) includes 
only means-end reasons (or reasoning). However, the above objection significantly 
1A 
shakes the convincingness of this assumption. Hence, the argument from direction of 
fit is not successful in answering the question how it is the case that someone's having a 
reason to do something can be captured by "a Humean picture in general", but not 
restricted to an instrumentalist picture of practical reasoning. Therefore, strong 
comprehensive Humeanism is not likely to be true. At most, it can make sense of the 
motivating power of instrumental reasoning, but not the motivating power of practical 
reasoning in general. 
25 For this point, one may refer to Shafer-Landau (2003). 
26 This assumption is also challenged by Korsgaard (1986). I have discussed Korsgaard's challenge in the 
previous chapter. 
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d. Objection 5: Pure cognitivist's challenge^? 
Pure cognitivists claim that talk of an agent's desire to act in a certain way - after a 
process of reasoning - is merely a way of indicating the fact that the agent is being 
motivated by his beliefs. In other words, they believe that beliefs alone can motivate 
actions. Pure cognitivist theory of motivation can take two forms: either a 
comprehensive theory of motivation, or a non-comprehensive theory of motivation. To 
make this line of objection stronger, we shall consider the non-comprehensive one. 
Non-comprehensive pure cognitivism holds that in some sorts of practical reasoning, 
"the desire [after a process of practical reasoning] just is the agent's being motivated by 
his beliefs" (Dancy 1993: 20). When explaining the motivational efficacy of some sorts 
of practical reasoning, desires are ascribed to agents as a way of indicating the fact that 
they have been motivated by a set of beliefs alone. According to the non-comprehensive 
pure cognitivist, in some cases an agent's motivation to intend in one way or in another 
way can be explained purely or merely by the following set of beliefs: 
(1) beliefs about what the practical problem is; 
(2) beliefs about what one can do to resolve the problem, and the possible consequences 
that one can conceive of after resolving the problem; and 
(3) beliefs about what will happen if one doesn't resolve the problem. 
The above theory allows us to make sense of some everyday cases. We sometimes 
appear to speak truthfully about our doing things even though we didn't want to do them, 
or wanted very much not to do them. In these cases, we cite our motives such as duty, 
27 This objection again is discussed by Shafer-Landau (2003). In presenting this line of objection, I have 
borrowed much from Shafer-Landau. 
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responsibility, and conscience. What motivate us are our beliefs about what reasons we 
have, what is appropriate, what we should or must do, regardless of our desires. 
If non-comprehensive pure cognitivist theory of motivation is plausible, PI and C5 
are threatened. 
Reply to objections 4 and 5 
Assume that objection 4 is sound. This line of objection would be a serious challenge 
to a strong comprehensive Humeanism if it has to be identified with bald 
instrumentalism. It is because bald instrumentalism suggests that reasoning generates 
motivation in us only through identifying means to antecedent desired ends. However， 
objection 4 suggests that what can motivate an agent can be some rational considerations 
that neither assume an end state nor entail postulation of some sought-after state of 
affairs. Unless it is successfully argued that the strong comprehensive Humeanism must 
be identified with bald instrumentalism, and assume that this line of objection is 
plausible, it can't draw the conclusion that the strong comprehensive Humeanism does 
not work. 
Objection 5, if plausible, would be a threat to the strong comprehensive Humeanism 
in general. It is because this line of objection denies the necessity of appealing to an 
agent's desire to explain the motivating power of practical reason. 
Encountering objections 4 and 5, we should note that the strong comprehensive 
Humeanism may not be that defensible. If one wishes to keep his loyalty to the strong 
comprehensive Humeanism, he will need to prepare good arguments in response to these 
28 This line of objection, if it is sound, would be a challenge to a weak comprehensive Humeanism. To 
recall, this sort of Humeanism claims that the motivational efficacy of practical reason is at least partly 
contributed by some sort of an agent's pre-existing desires. 
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two objections. Alternatively, if one wishes to preserve his faith in Humeanism in 
general, he may consider a weak comprehensive version, or some other non-
comprehensive versions. I am going to introduce a weak comprehensive version, which I 
call partial Humeanism (hereafter PH). 
V. Partial Humeanism (PH) 
In this section, I try to offer an argument in support of PH. Then, I will examine the 
merits of PH and follow it criticisms. 
A. An argument for PH^^  
PH attempts to deal with the question of whether in actual human beings, reasoning 
that purports to show that there is some reason for an agent to (p sometimes 
nonaccidentally generates motivation to (p without the assistance of antecedent 
motivation/ desire (Mele 2003: 90).^ ^ PH argues that whenever evaluative reasoning -
reasoning about what it would be best or good enough to do - nonaccidentally generates 
motivation in actual human beings, a certain kind of antecedent desire contributes "at 
least partly，’ to the motivational base of the generated motivation.^^ 
According to PH, the presence of a certain sorts of desire makes more sense of why an 
agent has an intention or desire to intend in accordance with the conclusion of a piece of 
reasoning. In other words, a certain sorts of desire are significant in explaining an 
29 In constructing an argument in defence of PH, my greatest debts are to Mele. The argument I present 
here is not the same as Mele's. For comparison between my argument and Mele's, please refer to chapter 
4 of Mele's Motivation and Agency (2003). 
Mele (2003: ch.4) is a supporter of PH. He doesn't call his position "partial Humeanism." Perhaps, I am 
the first one who calls this sort of position in this way. 
However, one should note that PH doesn't claim that some appeal to antecedent desire involves direct or 
indirect official endorsement to the premises of evaluative, motivation-producing reasoning (cf. Mele 
2003: 95). It remains silent on the rational approval or disapproval of the premises. 
Varieties of Humeanism 87 
agent's being motivated by the conclusion of a piece of reasoning. The following is an 
argument for PH.^ ^ 
PI The purpose of practical reasoning is to lead to a satisfactory resolution in response 
to one's practical problem. 
P2 We assume that an agent, when encountering a practical problem, has an intention or 
desire to settle on what to do in response to that problem. Let's call this intention or 
desire a "settling intention" or a "settling desire." 
P3 To resolve the practical problem, the agent may either (1) make judgements about 
what it would be best to do, or (2) make judgements about what to do in a way that 
he would find acceptable, or good enough. 
P4 After a process of practical reasoning, the agent arrives at a conclusion about what to 
do. The conclusion is a proposed solution for the practical problem. 
P5 The agent, with the settling intention or desire, is naturally disposed to intend in 
accordance with the conclusion. 
P6 If the agent judges it best to (p but is still unsettled about whether to cp, he has not 
resolved his practical problem. 
Therefore, 
CI The agent's engaging in practical reasoning and his intention to follow the 
reasoning's conclusion are driven at least partly by his antecedent settling intention 
or desire. 
32 This line of argument can be found in Mele's Motivation and Agency (2003: 87 - 88). While the spirit 
of the argument I present here is similar to Mele's, the details are different. 
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C8 Generally, an agent's engaging in practical reasoning and his intention to follow the 
reasoning's conclusion are driven at least partly by a certain sorts of antecedent 
desire. 
C9 A certain sorts of antecedent desire are significant in explaining an agent's being 
motivated by the conclusion of a piece of reasoning. 
The convincingness of the above argument can be shown more explicitly through 
answering the question why an agent's reasoning takes the form of reasoning about what 
it is best to do (or what it is good enough to do). His engaging in this form of reasoning 
can be explained, at least partly, by his having an intention or a desire to do whatever is 
best (or good enough) in his circumstances, namely a settling intention or desire (see P2 
and P3). Moreover, a desire of this kind is an obvious candidate for an element in the 
motivational base of an intention or desire for following the reasoning's conclusion." It 
is because the presence of this settling intention or desire makes more sense of why an 
agent has an intention or desire to follow the reasoning's conclusion. Why does this 
make more sense? 
Grant that the agent has a settling intention or desire. And grant that — through a 
process of reasoning - he comes to the conclusion that it would be best (or good enough) 
to (p. With the presence of these conditions, it is natural for us to expect that an intention 
to (p derives at least part of its motivational force from the settling intention or desire. In 
other words, the presence of the settling intention or desire makes it more likely for the 
agent to intend in accordance with the reasoning's conclusion. 
Let us examine the advantages PH has before we decide whether to accept it. 
We should bear in mind that the above argument in support of PH doesn't claim that (or doesn't argue 
that) the antecedent desire at issue is all that we can say of the motivational base of an agent's desire to 
engage in practical reasoning, or to intend in accordance with the reasoning's conclusion. 
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B. Merits o fP t f* 
A prima facie merit of PH is its being free of mystery. It is not mysterious how a 
desire or intention to (p would derive some of its force from a relevant antecedent desire. 
For example, an agent has an antecedent desire for an end e. He knows that he can 
achieve e by cp-ing. He is thus motivated to cp. His being motivated to (p is at least partly 
contributed by his antecedent desire. Let's consider another example. Suppose an agent 
has an antecedent desire to do whatever it would be best (or good enough) to do when 
encountering a practical problem. It is pointed out 一 through a process of reasoning - to 
him that it would be best (or good enough) for him to cp in order to solve the practical 
problem he encounters. He is thus motivated to cp. Again, this example shows that there 
is nothing mysterious in saying that an agent's being motivated to cp is at least partly 
contributed by his antecedent desire. 
To see the plausibility of PH, let's consider a more concrete example. The example 
goes like this. Tim is going to finish his master thesis in this academic year. Recently, he 
was offered an attractive job. If he wants to finish his thesis on time, he has no time for 
this job. If he is employed, he won't have enough time to complete his thesis on time. 
He wants to do whatever it would be best to do in response to this practical problem. He 
seeks the advice of several knowledgeable, trustworthy friends. After considerable 
consultation, he reasons as follows: 
PI The many knowledgeable, trustworthy friends I consulted agree that it would be best 
to keep writing my thesis. 
When I consider the advantages PH has, I am deeply indebted to Mele (2003: ch.4) for his thoughtful 
comparison between the capacity arguments of the rationalist approach (e.g. Korsgaard's formulation of 
CPR) and the arguments of PH. 
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P2 Such agreement is significant evidence, and there is little contrary evidence. 
Therefore, 
C3 It probably would be best to keep writing my thesis. 
Normally, or naturally, we expect Tim to intend in accordance with the reasoning's 
conclusion. We take C3 as potentially motivating. It's very likely that the motivational 
potential of C3 derives at least some of its motivational potential from Tim's antecedent 
desire, namely his desire to do whatever it would be best to do in response to the 
problem he encountered. Provided that Tim has no antecedent desire that does or can 
incline him to do whatever it would be best to do, it makes less sense that C3 is capable 
of motivating him.^ ^ 
C. Criticisms36 
There are three objections against PH. The first objection is directed against the nature 
of the desire in question. The desire is so abstract and general that it is not clear it 
conflicts with anything the cognitivists say. Isn't it just the desire to do what is right or 
reasonable, regardless of what situations we find ourselves in? 
PH acknowledges that the desire in question is a general one, namely the desire to do 
whatever is best (or good enough) in response to a practical problem. However, PH 
doesn't remain silent on what the cognitivists say. If it is true that the desire in question 
contributes at least partly to the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning, then it is 
false to say that desire has no role to play in explaining the motivational efficacy of 
Hume (1739/ 40: book 2, part 3，§ 3’ paragraph 6) says that it is not unreasonable to prefer one's lesser 
good to his greater. Since PH attempts to restrict the range of desires to desire for doing what would be 
best, it is inappropriate to call it 'partial Humeanism.' Assume that it is Humean, it is "restricted 
Humeanism." I thank my external examiner for this important clarification. 
36 I am grateful for Chris Fraser’s criticisms on PH. 
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practical reasoning. Hence, PH is obviously against at least one form of cognitivism, 
namely pure cognitivism.^^ However, one can complain that it is not clear PH conflicts 
with other forms of cognitivism such as CMI.^ ^ 
The second objection targets the range of cases that PH can explain. The cases PH can 
capture are very limited. At most, it can explain only cases in which an agent obviously 
has an antecedent desire. In many problems we have no antecedent desire beyond “being 
good" or "doing what is right.” 
The last criticism is targeted at the originality and the plausibility of PH. It seems PH 
is baldly instrumentalist in spirit, but presented in a more plausible way. Both PH and 
bald instrumentalism share an unquestioned belief that a desire or intention to (p would 
derive (some of) its force from a relevant antecedent desire. But this belief is 
controversial. If bald instrumentalism is not an adequate theory of motivation, then PH is 
not likely to be an exception. 
VI. Looking Backward and Looking Forward 
I think that all sorts of Humeanism share a general intuition that desires (or affective/ 
sentimental states) play an essential role in explaining the motivational efficacy of 
practical reasoning. Different types of Humeanism work out different interpretations or 
arguments for this general intuition. We have tried to capture this Humean intuition by 
PDIO. According to this principle, an agent's intention or desire to follow the conclusion 
of a piece of reasoning must come from a certain desire input; and the output of 
intending or desiring in accordance with the reasoning's conclusion must have an input. 
37 For a sketch of pure cognitivism, see IV. C. d. of this chapter. 
38 For a more detailed discussion about CMI, see the previous chapter. 
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We have seen three attempts to characterize or argue for this principle. They are bald 
instrumentalism, argument from direction of fit, and PH. But all of them fail to defend 
PDIO convincingly. One common defect in their attempts can be put in this way. 
Despite their common ambition to offer a general theory of the motivational efficacy of 
practical reasoning, the types of practical reasoning they may capture are very limited. If 
their arguments for (or characterizations of) PDIO were successful at all, at most they 
could argue for (or explain) the cases in which an agent (obviously) has an antecedent 
desire. It becomes quite clear that a satisfactory Humean theory of motivation should 
fulfill at least the following two conditions^^: 
(1) Instead of offering a narrowly preconceived explanation of the motivational 
efficacy of practical reasoning - such as bald instrumentalism - the candidate 
theory should be able to explain or capture different sorts of practical reasoning, 
including at least instrumental reasoning as well as non-instrumental reasoning.^o 
(2) The candidate theory, if it is Humean in spirit, must embrace the general Humean 
intuition that desires (or affective/ sentimental states) play an essential role in 
explaining the motivational power of practical reasoning. 
In the next chapter, I will try to look for a Humean theory which satisfies the above 
conditions. 
39 These two conditions are necessary for a satisfactory Humean theory of motivation. I am not sure if they 
are also sufficient conditions. 
40 We assume that it is plausible to work out a general (or comprehensive) theory of motivation. Certainly, 
this bold assumption is open to dispute. We have good reason to be sceptical about this ambition, for there 
is a big variety in our experience of being motivated by practical reasoning. In addition, the fact that there 
are numerous senses of desire makes the construction of a general theory of motivation more difficult. 
Furthermore, the concept of motivation is vague and ambiguous. I discussed a bit on these points in 






Can desire have a motivational presence in my reasoning about what to do, 
figuring in the background, as it were, without figuring in the content of my 
reasoning, in the foreground (Pettit and Smith 1990: 565)? In this chapter, I argue 
that a certain sort of desire is an enabling condition that explains how we are able to 
engage in practical reasoning, and act in accordance with the reasoning's conclusion. 
This sort of desire figures in the background without figuring in the content of my 
reasoning, in the foreground. 
How can I establish this thesis? There are two steps: First, build a two-level model 
of practical deliberation. Specifically, I argue for a background-foreground 
framework to explain the operation of practical deliberation. After establishing this 
framework, I argue that desire can figure in the background without figuring in the 
foreground. This is the task to be done chiefly in section II. Second, explain the role 
of background desire in explaining the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning. I 
argue that background desire is a necessary enabling condition for my engaging in 
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practical reasoning, and acting on the reasoning's conclusion. I will do this in section 
III. 
What are the merits of the two-level model? First, it avoids the difficulties 
encountered by the single-level (Humean) model such as bald instrumentalism, 
argument from direction of fit, and PH. Specifically, while the single-level (Humean) 
model ignores, or cannot successfully explain non-means-end reasoning, the 
two-level model can. Second, the two-level model offers a more plausible alternative 
for Humeanism. It tries to background the PDIO by showing that background desire 
is a necessary condition for all operation of practical reasoning. 
II. Strict Background View of Desire 
I want to argue that desire can figure in the background of deliberation without 
figuring in the foreground. Following Pettit and Smith (1990: 565), I shall call this 
the strict background view of desire. To defend this position, there are at least three 
tasks to complete. First, I will introduce two conceptions of human action, namely 
the intentional conception and the deliberative conception. Second, assuming that the 
two conceptions are sound, I will try to make sense of the background-foreground 
framework. This framework enables us to analyze the presence of desire from two 
perspectives, namely from the background of deliberation, or from its foreground (i.e. 
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the content of deliberation). Third，granting that the background-foreground 
framework is sound, I attempt to examine whether desire is always present in the 
background, and whether desire is always present in the foreground. 
In order to make the strict background view more precise and plausible, I shall 
attack two false views concerning the foreground presence of desire on the one hand, 
and try to characterize background desire on the other hand. I will end this section 
with a sketch of the application and the limitation of the background-foreground 
framework. 
A. Two conceptions of intentional action 
In this part, I am going to introduce two conceptions of human action: the 
intentional conception and the deliberative conception. I will offer arguments in 
support of these two conceptions later on. 
The intentional conception suggests that every normal intentional human action is 
causally explained by the relevant set of beliefs and desires of the agent (565 - 6)] 
There is another dimension of human action. Normal intentional human actions 
can be divided into deliberative or non-deliberative. Whether a normal intentional 
human action is deliberative depends on whether the action is "at least partly" a 
1 For a classic and well-known defence of this intentional conception, see Davidson's "Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes," in his Essays on Actions and Events (2001: 3 - 20). 
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product of deliberation. Human agents often deliberate on what to do in response to a 
practical problem. They consider different options. They ask, "What are the desirable 
features for each option?’’ And they weigh these options according to their desirable 
properties. These desirable properties make the preferred option an appropriate 
action to choose: the presence of some properties of the candidate action suggests 
that it is right or good or permissible or whatever. Hence, when the agent deliberates 
on what to do, it is the desirable properties of the candidate action that justify his 
decision. In short, normal intentional human actions can be a product of deliberation, 
and deliberation is essentially connected to justification. I'll describe this as the 
deliberative conception of human actions. 
Accepting the deliberative conception does not require us to endorse the claim that 
decision making is fully controlled by deliberative reasoning (or practical reasoning). 
Normally, in making decisions, we will not go through each relevant consideration. 
What the deliberative conception really suggests is that an agent can have a certain 
degree of rational control over her decision about what to do. Her decision is partly 
the product of a piece of practical reasoning (Pettit and Smith 1990: 567) or her 
arriving at a decision is partly guided by some rational considerations. To make the 
claim of this conception explicit, somewhere in the process of decision making there 
2 See Pettit and Smith 1990: 566，567. 
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normally appears a thought of the form "cp-ing has the property of being F, or of 
leading to a state of affairs that is F, (and F is worthwhile,) so I should 9." But this 
conception need not hold that that form of thought is necessarily explicit, in the sense 
of being represented as a piece of practical reasoning contemplated by the agent. We 
claim only that we can ascribe such a thought to the agent. 
To sum up, there are two conceptions concerning human actions: 
1. The intentional conception: every normal intentional action proceeds from a set of 
beliefs and desires that explains it. 
2. The deliberative conception: somewhere in the process leading to action there is 
normally the belief that the option chosen has a property which provides some 
justification for choosing it (Pettit and Smith 1990: 566). 
To some philosophers,^ theorists of practical reasoning should explain the 
connection between these two conceptions. 
I will briefly explain how these two conceptions can be simultaneously fulfilled in 
everyday conditions. Suppose an agent encounters a practical problem. To solve the 
problem, he can choose option 1 (Ol) or option 2 (02). After a process of 
deliberation, he chooses Ol because he believes that, other things constant, Ol is 
more likely to bring about a particular state of affairs S. With his belief that 01 is 
3 For example, Smith and Pettit (1990). 
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more likely to bring about S, the intentional conception will be fulfilled so long as he 
also has a desire with enough intensity for S.4 And the deliberative conception will 
be fulfilled so long as he is moved by the thought that S has a certain desirable 
property (and this property provides some justification for his choosing 01). 
B. The background-foreground framework^ 
As I have said in the previous part, theorists of practical reasoning should explain 
the connection between the intentional and the deliberative conceptions. One strategy 
is to apply the background-foreground framework to link up these two conceptions. 
In doing so, we encounter two questions: 
1. The background-foreground question about desire: Whether or not desire is 
always present in the background of deliberation and whether or not it is 
always present in the foreground (i.e. the content of deliberation). 
2. How can we characterize the relation between the background and the 
foreground? Or, what are the roles of the background and the foreground in 
explaining an agent's action? 
I will discuss the first question here and the second question later. 
4 Note that, here desire is being conceived as an object with two aspects: first, what is desired, i.e. the 
content of desire, and second, the intensity of the desire. Let's call this two-dimensional view of desire. 
I have borrowed this label from Richardson (2004). 
5 In making sense of the background-foreground framework in this part, I have borrowed a lot from 
Pettit and Smith (1990: 567 - 8). 
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Pettit and Smith (1990: 567 - 8) suggest that in linking up the two conceptions, we 
encounter the background-foreground question about desire. The question can be 
formulated as follows. If the intentional conception is sound, desire is supposed to 
figure in the background of decision making (or practical reasoning) in every case. 
(But is it true that desire always has a background presence? I will tackle this 
problem in sub-section D.) Assume that the deliberative conception is sound. Then 
there is a question about whether that desire must appear in the foreground, where 
practical reasoning takes place. 
Suppose that an agent (ps because her belief that (p-ing will lead to an event S and 
because she desires S with enough intensity.^ The question we encounter is whether 
that means that the thought that "(p-ing has the property of promising to fulfill my 
desire for S, hence I should (p" must appear in the "content" (or the foreground) of 
her deliberation. Her desire for S figures in the background if and only if it explains 
her choice or decision but plays no explicit role in reasoning. It figures in the 
foreground if and only if she makes that decision through the recognition that she has 
that desire and that the option has the desirable property of promising to fulfill her 
desire. Generally, a desire is present in the background of an agent's deliberation 
about what to do if and only if the relevant set of beliefs and desires explains the 
6 This description is not yet a background description or a foreground description of desire. It is a 
description in which we have not applied the background-foreground framework. 
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agent's decision about what to do. A desire appears in the foreground of the 
deliberation if and only if the agent believed that she had that desire and was 
convinced by the belief that a certain property (connected with the chosen candidate) 
justified her choice. 
Note that the background-foreground framework is a functional distinction. It has 
nothing to do with the split between the conscious and the non-conscious. A 
reflective agent can be aware of a background desire. 
C. Clarifying the two conceptions: 
Begging the questions?^ 
Perhaps the intentional conception would beg the question against a certain form 
of cognitivism, particularly pure cognitivism. Pure cognitivism suggests that 
cognitive states are sufficient to motivate action. If this is true, it is against the 
intentional conception, according to which desires are necessary for the genesis of 
action. Note that the intentional conception does not necessarily conflict with all 
sorts of cognitivism. It only rules out one sort of cognitivism: the sort which denies 
that desire is necessary for someone to act on a reason. It leaves open the possibility 
that the desires which figure in the production of action can be partly generated by 
7 In preparing this part, I have drawn heavily from Pettit and Smith 1990: 570 - 1. 
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some cognitive states. The desires may be entailed by the presence of certain 
o 
evaluative beliefs. Anyway, some readers may be eager to know how to argue for 
the intentional conception. I will consider an argument in the next sub-section. 
The deliberative conception may seem to beg the question against certain pictures 
of practical reasoning. The conception suggests that deliberation always involves a 
thought of the form: "cp-ing has the property of being F，or of leading to a state of 
affairs that is F, (and F is worthwhile,) so I should (p." The point of the deliberative 
conception can be summed up as follows. “[I]n reaching a decision the human agent 
adverts to a property of the option chosen which, whatever the required context, 
provides him with a justifying reason for his choice” (Pettit and Smith 1990: 571). 
According to this conception, an agent tries to justify her choice by referring to 
properties of the option chosen. For example, that the option is morally sound, that it 
is interesting, aesthetically pleasing, and so on. So this conception rules out the view 
that referring to properties (of the option chosen) plays no justifying role in an 
agent's decision making (571). By clarifying what the deliberative conception says 
on the one hand, and pointing out some misunderstanding of it on the other hand, I 
will show in sub-sections E and F that it is convincing. 
8 One possible candidate is CMI. 
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D. Is desire always present in the background? 
Here are four different views concerning the presence of desire in the background 
and in the foreground: 
1. Desire is always present in the background. 
2. Desire is not always present in the background. 
3. Desire is always present in the foreground. 
4. Desire is not always present in the foreground. 
There are four possible combinations: (1，3), (1，4), (2, 3), (2, 4). 
If the intentional conception of human actions - the view that every normal 
intentional human action is the product of belief and desire - is sound, then positions 
(2，3) and (2，4) are not likely to be true. Here is an argument in favor of the view 
that desire is always present in the background^: 
P1 If there are normal intentional human actions, they are characteristically done for 
reasons. 
P2 If an agent has a reason to (p, she has a certain goal: say, the goal that p. 
P3 If she has such a goal, then she is being disposed, given appropriate beliefs, to act 
so that p. 
P4 If she is being so disposed, she is desiring that p. 
9 Compare with Pettit and Smith (1990: 573) and Smith (1987: 45 - 55). 
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Therefore, 
C5 If an agent has a reason to cp, her having a reason to cp necessarily involves the 
presence of an appropriate desire. 
Therefore, 
C6 If there are normal intentional human actions, they are products of beliefs and 
desires. 
Pettit and Smith (1990: 573) would find the above argument compelling. However, I 
think that it is compelling only if one already accepts P2. P2 assumes an 
instrumentalist picture of human practical reasoning - a view that human agents can 
be motivated only by having pre-existing ends or forming new ends." According to 
the instrumentalist picture, an agent has a reason to (p because (p-ing helps him to 
achieve a certain desired goal, or (p-ing is constitutive to his desired end. However, 
the instrumentalist picture is controversial, and so the above argument - which is 
dependent on it - is too. Even though in some cases we are motivated by having 
pre-existing ends or forming new ends, that doesn't mean the instrumentalist picture 
is the only legitimate account of normal intentional human actions. The 
instrumentalist picture can capture only cases in which we are motivated at least 
partly by antecedent desires or newly formed ends, but not cases of non-means-end 
I am thankful for Chris Fraser's helpful suggestion about the characterization of an instrumentalist 
view of practical reasoning. 
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considerations, if such exist. Unless the instrumentalist picture can successfully 
explain away the possibility of being motivated by non-means-end considerations, it 
cannot be a satisfactory theory of intentional human action. 
I think that the above argument for the background presence of desire cannot be 
detached from an instrumentalist position. Indeed the argument presupposes the 
instrumentalist position. To argue for the background presence of desire, one should 
offer other forms of argument which can be separated from the (traditional) 
instrumentalist line of thought. This would be challenging: on the one hand, one must 
argue that desire is present in the background of practical deliberation; on the other 
hand one must avoid committing oneself to the (traditional) instrumentalist 
conception of human actions. The view that desire has a background presence still 
owes us a convincing argument. I guess a candidate argument comes from the 
conception that considers background desire an enabling condition of practical 
deliberation. I will return to the conception of "background desire as enabling 
condition" in section III. 
E. Is desire always present in the foreground? 
Suspending the issue of whether desire must always be present in the background, 
let's concentrate on the issue of whether desire must always be present in the 
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foreground. Even if one can successfully argue that desire is always present in the 
background of practical deliberation, it doesn't entail that desire is also always 
present in the foreground. But it is less clear whether or not the foreground issue has 
no logical implication for the background issue. To have a clearer understanding of 
the foreground-background relation, we need to look closer at the foreground issue. 
The deliberative conception says that the considerations - figuring in the 
foreground — which move the agent may be of the kind: (p-ing would be interesting, 
or aesthetically pleasing，or morally correct, and so on. These considerations need 
not be narrowed down to, reduced to, or characterized as means-end considerations — 
that (p-ing would satisfy the agent's desire that p. Hence, all the deliberative 
conception suggests is that desire sometimes figure in the foreground, but not 
always. 
Our daily stories of deliberation run against the hypothesis that desire always has a 
foreground presence/^ What happens when an agent deliberates about what to do? 
The agent will not always consider her desire-states or her belief-states. When she 
deliberates, or reasons about what to do, from time to time she will consider the 
relevant set of beliefs that she “already takes to be true" (apparently at least), such as 
that p or that q, without referring to whether or not she believes that p or that q (Pettit 
“Pett i t and Smith (1990: 574) are two of the many philosophers who support this claim. 
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and Smith 1990: 574). Similarly, when the agent deliberates, from time to time she 
will consider the “alleged fact’，that it is worthwhile in some way that r or s - it 
would be fascinating, aesthetically pleasing, or morally sound if r or s - without 
paying attention to whether or not she desires that r or that s or even desires the 
relevant value-making property (574). Hence, considerations of the agent's 
desire-states or belief-states will not always figure in the content (or foreground) of 
deliberation. 
Certainly, the deliberative conception is consistent with the claim that an agent 
sometimes considers her desire-states, as she may consider her belief-states. 
Sometimes an agent may pay attention to the fact that she has this or that passion or 
yen or hankering. I will come back to this point later. 
F. Two false views concerning the foreground presence of desire 
In deciding about what to do, some theorists contend that an agent generally will 
consider the relevant considerations that he already takes to be true without referring 
to his desire-states. Referring to one's desire-states - which is conceived as a 
"self-concerned" act - seems to be the exception. ^ ^ But I think these theorists 
12 For example, see Pettit and Smith (1990: 575). Here, I have borrowed the term "self-concern" from 
them (575). The term "self-concern" in this context means "referring to one's desire-states." It has 
nothing to do with the distinction between egoistic concern and altruistic concern. One's desire-states 
can be egoistic as well as altruistic. We have no good reason to suppose that (1) any act of referring to 
one's desire-states or (2) the content of one's desire must be egoistic in nature. The term 
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underestimate the frequency or normality of self-concemed cases. When I deliberate 
about whether I should further my study in philosophy, I want to know if I really 
enjoy studying it, or whether I have a passion for it. Referring to my desire-states 
does not necessarily exclude my other non-self-concemed considerations, let's say, 
whether doing philosophy will make my life more fruitful, whether it will make any 
significant contributions to other people, and so o n . � I n this example, both 
self-concemed and non-self-concemed considerations would matter, or figure in the 
content of my deliberation. It is not unusual for us to make a compromise (or balance) 
between these two sorts of considerations, though the more significant the problem, 
the more difficult to make a compromise (or balance). When we deliberate about 
some important matters intimately related to us such as to which career should we 
devote ourselves, whether I should get married to that girl, and the like, we do not 
only consider some non-self-concemed considerations. We also care about what we 
really desire or want.i4 
"non-self-concem" here means "without referring to one's desire-states." 
It seems that it is quite obvious that referring to a person's desire-states cannot completely answer 
the questions of whe^er something has importance to that person's life or to other people. This claim 
is different from the more radical claim that whether something is meaningful to a person's life or to 
other people is completely independent of the desire-states of that person. I don't embrace this radical 
claim. The radical claim implies that someone's desire-states have no role to play in answering the 
question of whether something is worthwhile to that person or to other people. This radical claim is 
not likely to be true in some cases. For example, when one thinks about to which career should he 
devote, or when one makes decision about whether he should get married to that girl, the significance 
of his decisions or considerations is at least partly contributed by his desire-states. 
14 It seems to me that the following description is true of some sort of practical deliberation. The fact 
that I know some relevant non-self-concemed considerations does not directly lead me to a definite 
option among other available options. Whether I will choose a particular option is not completely 
determined by my knowing of the relevant non-self-concemed considerations. Some self-concemed 
considerations contribute at least partly to my choice. Self-concemed considerations can be relevant 
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I contend that when we deliberate about what to do, both self-concerned and 
non-self-concemed considerations can figure in the content of the deliberation. The 
degree of importance or the weight of the sort of considerations in question depends 
on the type of deliberation in which we are engaged. For example, in moral 
deliberation, normally we do not pay (much) attention to self-concerned 
considerations; because a person's desire-states cannot (sufficiently) answer the 
question of whether it is morally correct or good for one to take a certain action.'^ 
But in cases of deliberating about (personal) enjoyment (e.g. hobbies or leisure 
activities), or important matters deeply or closely connected to our life project (e.g. 
career and marriage), I don't see why self-concerned considerations are not relevant. 
If what I have proposed is correct, then the following claims are too general and 
hence unlikely to be true: 
(a) The exceptionist foreground view of desire: Desire is usually not present in 
the foreground (i.e. the content of deliberation), more specifically, 
"self-concern seems to be the exception, not the rule” (Pettit and Smith 1990: 
under some conditions. 
For example, suppose I know the relevant non-self-concemed considerations about taking 
philosophical investigation to be one's career. Similarly, I can know of the relevant 
non-self-concemed considerations of being involved in some other careers. However, the mere 
knowledge of these considerations may not lead me to a definite option directly. After all, decision of 
one's career is normally at least partly contributed by one's preference, desire, or passion. Hence, 
referring to one's desire state in this sort of cases is not irrelevant, nor an exception. 
But I think the degree of importance or the weight of one's desire-states in the content of moral 
deliberation depends on the type of moral deliberation in which an agent is engaged. In case of 
thinking about whether it is virtuous to (p, I think sometimes the agent's desire-states (i.e. whether he 
has a desire to (p) may matter. All in all, I want to suggest that the degree of importance or the weight 
of the sort of considerations (self-concerned ones or non-self-concemed ones) in question depends on 
the type of deliberation in which we are (or an agent is) engaged. 
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575). 
(b) The omnipresent foreground view of desire: On this view, in both moral and 
non-moral forms of reasoning, the premises always ascribe desires to the 
agent (575). The agent's desire for the option chosen - stated explicitly or 
implied in the reasoning's conclusion - is always grounded in the property of 
the option, that it fits the agent's pre-existing desires, or it answers 
appropriately to the agent's desires stated in the premises (576). 
There are two mistakes in the omnipresent view. First, it misrepresents our daily 
experience of deliberation, especially deliberation concerning moral issues. Suppose 
that I decide to (p because I consider it my responsibility. On the omnipresent view, 
my reasoning about what to do must have included the premise that I desire to fulfill 
my responsibility and that (p-ing has the desirable property of promising to fulfill my 
desire to meet my responsibility. But this way of representing the content of my 
deliberation is inappropriate. Surely, sometimes, when we think about what to do, 
our desire to (p can be motivated by the consideration that cp-ing is within our 
responsibility, even though we do not have an antecedent desire to (p. Being a teacher, 
one of my responsibilities is to provide at least some minimal guidance for my 
students when they have difficulties in learning the subject I teach. Even though I 
may be deeply disappointed with a particular student - perhaps he is so lazy and so 
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naughty - I “have to” help him so long as he tries to ask for my help. I may have no 
antecedent desire to help him, but I “have to" help him, for it is my duty. To say so 
does not entail that practical reasoning never has our desire being present in the 
content of the reasoning. The point is: our recognition of the relevant moral 
consideration can motivate us to (p even though we do not have an antecedent desire 
to (p and we don't explicitly think about our desire to conform with the moral 
consideration. 16 
Second, the omnipresent view makes a wrong assumption that what incites a 
person's desire to cp - after deliberation - must be the prospect of relieving or 
fulfilling the person's antecedent desire (to cp)" The omnipresent view presupposes 
instrumentalism about practical reasoning, which is controversial. 
We should note that instrumentalism can be formulated in a foreground version as 
well as a background version. When we take it as a foreground view, it suggests that 
an agent comes to believe that he has reason to cp because (p-ing has the property of 
answering appropriately to his (antecedent) desires. In other words, within the 
content of deliberation, he arrives at the conclusion that he should (p through the 
16 The advocates of the omnipresent view may argue that I am motivated by the consideration that it 
is my duty to (p because I already have a desire to fulfill my responsibility. But I will argue that this 
sort of desire figures in the background of my deliberation, not in the foreground (i.e. the content of 
my deliberation). Within the content of my deliberation, I come to the conclusion that I should cp 
because I recognize that (p-ing is my duty. I will return to this point in the next section, i.e. 
"Background Desire as Enabling Condition." 
17 For similar point, see Pettit and Smith (1990: 577). 
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premises that ascribe desires to him. Here, it is foreground instrumentalism which is 
under consideration. When we view instrumentalism as a background view, it 
suggests that the functioning of practical deliberation depends on the presence of a 
background desire to do what is reasonable. We may regard the foreground version 
as strong instrumentalism or bald instrumentalism. The background version is more 
moderate - and thus I guess it is more p laus ib le ." (The background version is 
compatible with some forms of cognitivism, for example Korsgaard's version of 
CMI.)i9 
If the omnipresent foreground view of desire is not likely to be true, does it follow 
that we have good reason to accept the exceptionist foreground view? The 
exceptionist holds that desire is usually not present in the foreground, specifically, 
"self-concern seems to be the exception, not the rule" (Pettit and Smith 1990: 575). 
The exceptionist continues, “[T]he best foreground description of our deliberation is 
certainly that we do what we do because we think it has some desirable property 
other than that of being desired by us’，(579). 
As I have argued before, while I agree that what motivates us is not the fact of 
whether or not we desire a certain course of action but what makes that action 
18 I will return to the background view in the next section, i.e. "Background Desire as Enabling 
Condition." Here, one may doubt whether the background version of instrumentalism can be qualified 
as instrumentalism at all. I am not sure at that moment; this requires further discussions. 
19 I suggest that any theory of motivation claiming that the functioning of practical deliberation 
depends on the presence of some background desire may be classified as quasi-Humeanism. 
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morally correct in some sorts of moral reasoning, I don't agree that "self-concern 
seems to be the exception, not the rule." Considering whether or not we desire a 
certain course of action is relevant in the cases of deliberation about which career we 
should devote ourselves to, which girl we should devote our life to, which movie 
shall I watch when I want to relax, and so on. In these cases, it is strange that 
considering what we desire is not relevant, or cannot figure in the content of our 
deliberation. I have argued for a moderate claim that in some cases of deliberation 
"self-concern" is relevant. I do not claim that "self-concern" is the only relevant 
factor, but it is one of the relevant factors. For example, apart from thinking about 
whether or not I really desire to get married to that girl, it would be better for me to 
consider also whether or not staying with that girl would make our life fruitful. In the 
cases of deliberation of one's career, one's another half, and the like, both 
self-concerned and non-self-concemed factors are relevant. 
To conclude, both the omnipresent and the exceptionist views are not likely to be 
the accurate 一 not to say the best - foreground description of our deliberation. They 
tend to over-simplify the varieties of deliberation, or they tend to magnify one sort of 
deliberations and at the same time neglect other sorts of deliberations. 
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G Characterizing background desire 
We have seen that desire is not always appear in the foreground. Does this entail 
that desire is not always present in the background? I can't see how an argument for 
the claim that desire is not always present in the foreground can have any 
implications for the background issue - whether or not desire is always present in the 
background. Pettit and Smith (1990: 579) think that the claim that a desire does not 
always appear in the foreground of deliberation is consistent with the claim that it 
appears in the background.^® But we have not offered a detailed characterization of 
what a background desire is. In this section, I will introduce my characterization of 
background desire first. Then I will point out four problems to the positing of such a 
desire. What come next will be some solutions. 
a. Characterization of background desire 
I take a background desire to be a disposition to realize what, in the foreground, 
would be seen as worthwhile.^ ^  Whether or not there is anything in a particular 
agent's psychology (or motivational set) corresponding to such a desire is a 
The claim that desire can have a background presence tells us nothing about its status as cognitive 
or non-cognitive. Hence, there is no support for cognitivism or non-cognitivism. 
21 Pettit and Smith (1990: 579) take a background desire to be "a disposition to realize what, in the 
foreground, is seen as desirable." But people can be motivated by something recognized as 
worthwhile, not only the things they desire. So their definition is too narrow. 
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completely contingent matter?^ Would this characterization of background desire be 
too thin, or too abstract to be informative or to be substantial? This sort of desire is 
different from some other sorts of desire which are typically filled with or are 
associated with some distinct feelings (i.e. phenomenological content) or sharp 
mental images (or imaginations). This sort of desire is dispassionate. It is simply a 
disposition to realize what, in the foreground of our deliberation, would be seen as 
interesting, morally fine, aesthetically pleasing and so on. We should not blame the 
characterization of this sort of desire for its lack of sharp feelings or vivid 
imaginations, unless we have good reason to deny the existence of some 
dispassionate desires which are simply characterized as dispositions to act in a 
certain way without reference to any phenomenological content. Pettit and Smith say, 
“[T]he positing of such a desire is not 'utterly vacuous.' For it would be utterly 
vacuous to posit such a desire only if there were nothing for a desire to be but 
something that is phenomenologically salient" (579). 
b. Four problems 
But there are four problems concerning the characterization or the positing of such 
22 The strength and the continuity of this sort of disposition in a person's psychology depends - to a 
large extent I believe — on the person's character or personality - and how the person's character or 
personality is formed or shaped is an entirely contingent matter. 
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a desire. I list them as follows: 
1. The first problem is about the identifiability of background desire. Some 
Humeans raise this question: If practical rationality is merely a matter of 
cognitive appreciation of a certain rational relations or considerations, how can 
we explain someone who understands but does not follow?24 In order to explain 
the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning, the background desire theorists 
combine a concept of disposition to do whatever is worthwhile with the cognitive 
aspect of rationality. But this does not tell much. The characterization of this 
disposition is too thin or abstract to be informative or substantial. This makes the 
disposition hardly one identifiable sort of disposition. The background desire 
theorists have to put flesh on this skeleton to make it better. 
2. The second problem is about the explanatory power of the concept of background 
desire. The positing of the desire/ disposition to realize what, in the foreground of 
our deliberation, would be seen as worthwhile, is nearly vacuous, in terms of 
explanatory power. 
3. The third problem is: how is the background desire theorists' view distinct from 
Korsgaard's view? 
4. The fourth problem is: how can we distinguish background desire from practical 
23 The problems are pointed out because of Chris Fraser's helpfiil comments. 
24 Korsgaard tried to tackle this problem. See Chapter 2, especially § V. 
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rationality, partly understood as a disposition to be rational? The background 
desire theorists conceive background desire as the disposition to realize what, in 
the foreground of our deliberation, would be seen as worthwhile. But how is it 
different from practical rationality, partly conceived as the disposition to be 
rational? 
c. Solutions 
Concerning the third problem, the background desire theorists may answer in this 
way. The difference between the background desire view and Korsggard's view lies 
in their understanding of the functional relation between cognitive appreciation of 
rational relations or considerations and the disposition to listen to what would be 
seen as worthwhile. 
Korsgaard thinks that to be practically rational involves a twofold capacity: 
cognitive appreciation and rational disposition. Being practically rational is 
understood as the presence of this twofold capacity. She does not characterize this 
twofold capacity in a two-level framework, namely foreground-background 
framework. 
The background desire theorist holds that to be practically rational, a necessary 
condition is to have a background desire to be rational. With this background desire, 
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the foreground operation of practical reasoning can be effective and hence guides the 
agent's actions. For the foreground to take effect, there must be the background 
presence of rational desire. 
In order to solve the first two problems - the problems of identifiability and 
explanatory power - we have to see how we may apply the background-foreground 
framework in understanding some daily life experience. Besides, we have to see how 
the positing of background desire can make sense of the motivational efficacy of 
practical reasoning. I will try to complete these tasks in sub-section H and section III. 
I think Korsgaard's view may encounter the problem of identifiability also. Her 
characterization of practical rationality (or CPR) involves two components. For one 
to be practically rational, one must be capable of two tasks: (1) performing certain 
rational mental operations through which one can recognize what is judged to be 
reasonable for one to do; and (2) letting the motivational force entailed in the 
compellingness of the rational considerations be transmitted to one's motivation, so 
that one will act accordingly. 
Her twofold characterization of practical rationality involves a capability to 
"allow" the compellingness of a rational consideration to guide one's action. Her 
conception depends on the convincingness of the concept of this capability, namely a 
disposition to "allow" what, through certain rational mental operations, would be 
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seen as worthwhile to guide one's action. But such a disposition or capability would 
be hardly identifiable, for it is too general or too thin. 
In what follows, I will show how we may apply the background-foreground 
framework in understanding prudence. 
H. Application and limitation of the background-foreground framework 
The background-foreground framework can be applied to make sense of prudence. 
Prudence includes mainly the belief that a person's future interests make a demand 
on him at any time, even at a time when he has no desire to meet those future 
interests (Pettit and Smith 1990: 590). A prudent agent is the one who has the 
disposition to listen to his future interests even when he has no occurent desire to 
satisfy those future interests. Such a disposition, or a desire for one's future interests 
is present in the background of his deliberation. When it is pointed out - in the 
foreground of deliberation - t o a prudent agent that cp-ing constitutes (or leads to the 
fulfillment of) his future interest, he will be moved to (p. The consideration that (p-ing 
will satisfy (or constitute) a future interest makes for its worthwhileness. Seeing the 
worthwhileness of (p-ing, he is motivated to act accordingly. Even the prudent agent 
is currently without the desire to (p, he will try to "force" himself to act accordingly. 
While the distinction between the background and the foreground is quite 
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intelligible, it is not clear what their roles are. In the coming section, I will focus on 
their roles in explaining the motivational efficacy of practical deliberation. 
III. Background Desire as an Enabling Condition 
In the previous section, I have argued for the strict background view of desire. It is 
claimed that desire can figure in the background of deliberation without figuring in 
the foreground. However, this view doesn't tell us the roles of the background and 
the foreground in explaining the motivational efficacy of practical deliberation. 
Without a theory about their roles in explaining the motivational force of practical 
deliberation, the strict background view alone cannot be an adequate theory of 
motivation. In this section, granting that the strict background view is sound, I shall 
argue for a conception of background desire as an enabling condition of action. 
A. The conception of background desire as an enabling condition 
A desire operating in the background is simply a disposition, or a commitment to 
realize what, in the foreground, would be seen as worthwhile (cf. Pettit and Smith 
2004: 283). Let's call it "an operative background desire." On the one hand, it (1) 
enables the agent's commencing practical deliberation. On the other hand, it (2) 
enables the agent to intend in accordance with what is recognized as worthwhile in 
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the foreground. 
An agent's operative background desire enables practical reason (or reasoning) to 
take effect. If a certain piece of practical reasoning can take effect, then the agent will 
be motivated by the reasoning's conclusion. In other words, an effective piece of 
practical reasoning can explain the agent's decision (or intention to act in a certain 
way). It is the content of the practical reasoning that explains the agent's decision or 
intention. The operative background desire enables this explanation to go through, 
without itself being part of that explanation. In other words, it provides an enabling 
condition for the candidate explanation to go through, or for the candidate piece of 
practical reasoning to take effect. I shall call this the conception of background 
desire as an enabling condition. But how this conception is fulfilled in our daily life? 
B. Two Examples 
Let's consider an example. One day, when I am watching TV news, I am informed 
that there was a serious tsunami at Southeast Asia. Many people lost their parents, 
have their houses destroyed, and so on. I am moved by the suffering of the people 
and I hope that I can do something to relieve even a little bit of it. I decide to donate 
a certain amount of money to Red Cross. I make this donation because I want to help 
25 In explaining the enabling role played by an agent's background operative desire, I have borrowed 
insights from Dancy (2000: 51). I have made used of Dancy's materials without sticking to his context. 
One should note that I am not re-stating or re-introducing his view. 
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the sufferers, and I have good reason to help them: the cost for me is very minor, but 
the benefit to the sufferers is significant. The reason I make this donation, or the 
reason that explains my donation, is different from the enabling conditions. The 
enabling conditions are such as my having enough money，my desire to do what is 
good, and perhaps my compassion for the sufferers. These enabling conditions make 
my being motivated by the reason plausible. They enable the reason that justifies my 
decision to take effect. 
The idea of operative background desire as an enabling condition can capture our 
common sense observations. In the above example, when I make the donation, my 
desire to do what is good does not figure in the explanation of this particular action. 
Why I make the donation is explained (and justified) by the reasons such as: we need 
to help the sufferers in natural disasters; we need to help people when the cost to us 
is very minor and the benefit to them is significant. These reasons justify my 
donation, and I make the donation because of them. My desire to do what is good -
i.e., the operative background desire - enables (smooth) transmission of the 
motivational force of the reasons to my psychology. This sort of desire and my 
having enough money are some enabling conditions that make my acting on those 
reasons plausible. 
Here is another example. A virtuous person who is really humble would not have 
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his desire to be humble being present in the foreground when he thinks about what to 
do in response to people's praise of his success, his excellence in doing something, or 
whatever merits of him. His desire to be humble is a background desire which does 
not figure in the reasons for his acting in a modest way in response to people's praise 
of his merits. Why is he not proud of his merits? Because he thinks that what he 
achieves is contributed by much support from other people. He does not think that he 
is the most important factor in obtaining those merits. Hence, he decides not to 
receive the honour given by a certain group of people. Throughout the reasoning of 
what to do in response to people's praise, his desire to be humble does not figure in. 
Rather, his disposition to be humble is constitutive of his disposition to do these 
things, namely engaging in this sort of reasoning and following the reasoning's 
conclusion. Surely, he can be conscious of his background desire. Equally possible, 
he may not be conscious of his background desire. Whether he is conscious of his 
background desire is not the rule to determine whether it is really his background 
desire. 
A person chooses not to receive people's praise because he wants to be humble is 
morally less admirable. His desire to be humble figures in his reason for choosing not 
to receive people's praise. Hence, his desire is a foreground one. His background 
desire would be something like: I desire to be praised. 
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C. Clarifications 
It is not accurate to claim that desire has no role to play in the motivational 
efficacy of practical reason (or reasoning). Equally misleading is another claim that 
desire alone explains why we acted in a certain way (in cases of normal intentional 
action). Desire has a certain role to play in our motivation to act in accordance with a 
certain reason or rational consideration. It is not always present in the foreground 
when we engage in practical reason, or when we act in accordance with a certain 
reason. It is the background or the enabling condition for our engaging in practical 
reason, or acting for reason. If I did x for reason r, then reason r explains my doing x. 
The explanation of my doing x is in terms of reasons. The enabling conditions are 
necessary for the explanation, but they are not part of the explanation itself. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Note that the conception of background desire as an enabling condition does not 
deny that reason (but not reason alone) can motivate action; it reminds us that there is 
a certain enabling condition which enables the functioning of practical reason. 
The conception may seem to be contentious in two respects. After all, if talk of 
background desire as an enabling condition is plausible, it implies that desire is 
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necessary for the genesis of action, or motivation. Talk of background desire as an 
enabling condition makes desire essential in this way does rule out one sort of 
cognitivism: the sort which denies that desire is necessary for someone to act on a 
reason (Pettit and Smith 1990: 569 - 70). 
There would be a lot of contention about the concept of background desire - for it 
is questionable whether it is accurate to call it a desire. I will come back to this issue 
in the concluding chapter. 
The two-level model (i.e. the strict background view of desire plus the conception 
of background desire as an enabling condition) is rather sketchy and experimental. 
But I think it is a plausible alternative in explaining the motivational effectiveness of 
practical reasoning. 
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5 
Fusionist Alternative: 
Dissolving the reason/ desire dichotomy 
In some sense we recognize reasons for action; yet reasons also involve a 
"motivationally colored reaction” of ours to the world. The central debate in 
motivational efficacy of practical reasons is about how to explain the precise 
role of recognition and reaction. The fusionist thinks that philosophers have 
distinguished them far too sharply (Griffin 2000: 289). 
I. Introduction 
A fusionist approach to motivation suggests that the long-lasting debate over the 
roles of cognitive appreciation of reasons and of conative reaction in explaining the 
motivational efficacy of practical reason is based on mistaken assumptions. There is 
a pair of problems: (a) how a purely cognitive process of reasoning can give rise to 
motivation, and (b) how purely conative reaction can be relevant to what is 
worthwhile for one to do. This pair of problems cannot be real problems unless what 
they assume is also real. They both assume that there is a sharp distinction between 
the cognitive and the conative in explaining the motivational efficacy of practical 
reasoning. A second assumption is that there is a motivational priority between the 
cognitive and the conative. The fusionist wants to challenge the legitimacy of these 
two assumptions and offer an account of the motivational efficacy of practical 
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reasoning in which the cognitive and the conative are conceptually interdependent 
and inseparable. 
The fusionist claims that we cannot understand the role of the cognitive, in itself, 
without the conative, and vice versa. The cognitive is essentially involved in the 
conative, and vice versa. The cognitive and conative elements are not divisible, 
independent components, but are "indivisibly fused together" (see Griffin 1996: 56 -
7). And because the cognitive and the conative are inseparably fused whenever an 
agent really grasps a piece of practical reason, the agent - under normal conditions -
is thus motivated to intend in accordance with it. In short, a fusionist approach is an 
approach which (1) tries to explain the nature of grasping a piece of practical reason 
and, (2) thus explain how grasping a piece of practical reason is capable of 
motivating an agent. 
II. Setting the Stage: 
The status of the debate without the fusionist alternative 
Philosophers since Plato have tended to treat the term ‘reason’ (or 'cognition,' 
‘understanding，）as distinct from and opposed to ‘desire，(or 'conation,' 'sentiment,' 
‘passion，，‘feeling，). These are conceived as two largely independent manifestations 
of the human mind (Griffin 1996: 32). Philosophers thus have to explain how reason 
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and desire interact in giving rise to motivation. Here are five logically possible 
alternatives concerning the relation between reason and desire: i 
The first group of options (a) assumes a certain view of the priority between 
cognition and sentiment and (b) accepts a sharp distinction between cognition and 
sentiment. Here are the candidates: 
i. Reason is primary, desire auxiliary. Reason plays a primary role in explaining 
the motivating power of practical reasoning. One's desire to act in accordance 
with the reasoning's conclusion is entailed or generated by the cognitive 
appreciation of some rational relations or considerations. Weak 
comprehensive rationalism holds such a view. For examples, see Nagel (1970) 
and Korsgaard's version of CMI (1986).^ 
ii. Desire is primary, reason auxiliary. Desire plays a primary role in explaining 
the motivational efficacy of practical deliberation. The role of reason is to 
identify available means to what the agent already desires. Strong 
comprehensive Humeanism advocates such a view. For examples, see bald 
instrumentalism, the argument from direction of fit, and perhaps Williams' 
internalism (1980).^ 
iii. Desire and reason rule together. Reason and desire are distinct from each 
‘ I say 'logically possible' for all the proposed alternatives are at least conceivable or imaginable. 
2 I discussed Korsgaard's (1986) version of CMI in chapter 2. 
3 I discussed strong comprehensive Humeanism in chapter 3 (§§ II - IV). For Williams's view, one 
may refer to chapters 2 (§§ V - VII) and chapter 4 (§ II’ F). 
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Other. They join together and contribute equally to the motivational force of 
practical reasoning. Weak comprehensive Humeanism and quasi-Humeanism 
support such a view. For examples, partial Humeanism (ch. 3, § V) and the 
version of quasi-Humeanism discussed in chapter 4. 
iv. Desire and reason are totally independent from each other in giving rise to 
motivation. That is, there is no interaction between reason and desire. This 
line of thought still assumes a sharp dichotomy of reason and desire.* 
The fusionist line of thought rejects both (a) that there is a fixed priority between 
cognition and sentiment and (b) that there is a sharp distinction between cognition 
and sentiment. This line of thought suggests that desire and reason are fused together, 
not sharply distinct. This approach is presented in Griffin (1996).^ 
A fusionist approach can be conceived of as an attempt to examine the 
presuppositions typically embraced by both the Humean (or sentimentalist) and the 
rationalist camps. In examining these presuppositions, the fusionist tries to dissolve 
the conventional problems, by presenting a third alternative. 
The Humeans or sentimentalists^ contend that the motivational efficacy of 
4 Perhaps, some sorts of strong comprehensive rationalism would embrace such a view. For example, 
perhaps Dancy's pure cognitivism (1993). 
In constructing this fusionist project, I have borrowed much from Griffin (1996: 21). One should 
note that Griffin's concern and mine are different (but intimately connected). While Griffin aims at 
investigating the nature of value judgement, I want to explore different alternatives in explaining the 
motivational efficacy of practical deliberation (and certainly practical deliberation involves value . 
judgements). 
6 I think ‘sentimentalist’ is a better label, for Hume is only one of the most significant members of the 
sentimentalist tradition. This way of labeling can be found in many philosophers' works, for example 
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practical deliberation (or grasping a rational consideration) is contributed by (an 
agent's) desires. Strong comprehensive Humeanism claims that the motivational 
power of all sorts of practical deliberation is entirely contributed by (an agent's) 
desires. Weak comprehensive Humeanism holds that the motivational energy of all 
sorts of practical deliberation is at least partly contributed by (an agent's) desires. 
Rationalists hold that the motivational efficacy of practical deliberation (or 
grasping a rational consideration) is contributed by (an agent's) cognitive judgment 
of what it would be best (or good enough) to do. Strong comprehensive rationalism 
holds that evaluative beliefs themselves are capable of motivating an agent. Weak 
rationalism contends that evaluative beliefs have to be combined with desires in 
order to motivate, but the generated desires are derived from (or entailed by) the 
evaluative beliefs. 
In the next section, I will discuss the motivation for a fusionist alternative. 
III. Challenges to Humeanism: 
Motivation for a fusionist alternative 
Fusionism is motivated by an intention to dissolve some unquestioned 
assumptions found in some discussions of the motivational question. In what follows, 
Griffin (1996: 148, footnote 8). 
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I will discuss three obvious assumptions. First, conation and cognition are separable 
components in explaining motivation. Second, it is conation that gives rise to 
motivation. Third, desire alone is sufficient to motivate and it is something conative 
in nature. 
A. Questioning the Humean separability thesis 
Humean theorists have commonly assumed in explaining the motivational efficacy 
of practical deliberation that we can - by pure cognition — isolate candidate courses 
of action and then, independently, react to these candidates with conative (or 
affective) approval or disapproval (see Griffin 1996: 25). Cognition and conation 
play different roles in practical deliberation. The former provides a map of what you 
can do in response to a practical problem; the latter sets goals, and hence tells you 
where you should go in response to the practical problem.? Let's call this the 
Humean separability thesis. According to this thesis, cognition is separable from 
conation. And the Humeans claim that it is our conative reaction towards the 
candidate courses of action which gives rise to motivation. But is this really the case? 
Practical deliberation is deliberation about what is worthwhile to do.^  Such 
7 The metaphor that "passion sets goals while reason provides a map" is borrowed from Dancy (2000: 
43). 
8 Perhaps a Humean will say that I am begging the question against her by saying this. She may insist 
that practical deliberation is deliberation about what the agent "will" do, that is, no claim that it is 
"really" worthwhile. I thank Chris Fraser for this remark. 
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deliberation is usually not a matter of first perceiving the candidate courses of action 
cognitively and then desire's "entering and happening to fix on" one candidate or 
other (Griffin 1996: 25). The act of sorting out the candidates we consider as things 
to do in response to a practical problem (or the act of drawing the map of what we 
can do in response to the practical problem) is far from purely cognitive. We sort out 
these candidates as in some way 'the best or good enough" options, and thus already 
organize our experience by selecting what we see favorably (or desirably). Moreover, 
it seems that a plausible account of the desirability features of candidate choices 
cannot be detached from certain characteristic human motivations (interests/ 
concerns) (Griffin 1996: 25). If this is the case, then cognitive appreciation of what is 
potentially worthwhile for us to do cannot be detached from a certain conative 
element, namely certain characteristic human motivations, interests, or concerns. 
Hence, cognition is not conation-free. If this is the case, then the Humean 
separability thesis is not likely to be true. I will return to the roles of cognition and 
conation in section IV, C and D. 
B. Raw desire and value-reflecting desire 
Some Humeans tend to insist that the state of desiring itself is sufficient to give 
rise to motivation for action. They insist that the motivating power comes from the 
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desiring state alone. In this context, desire is being taken to be a sort of conative/ 
sentimental/ affective state, in contrast to some typically cognitive state such as 
reasoning and understanding. 
Normally, “raw，，desire in the sense of a mere urge does not provide sufficient 
motivation for action. Sometimes, we may encounter with some urges, such as an 
urge to escape from our works or duties, an urge to hit someone, or an urge to 
damage something, and so on. Sometimes, our urges to do something can be very 
strongly or deeply felt. But usually, raw desire as mere urge, even with high intensity, 
is insufficient to motivate an intellectually and psychologically normal person. In 
normal human intentional action, an agent is motivated by her desire only if she sees 
something valuable or worthwhile concerning what is desired. She is motivated by 
her recognition of something as having value. 
In normal human intentional action, the sort of desire that motivates action must 
involve the recognition of something as having value. This sort of desire is no mere 
urge; it involves some cognitive element 一 the appreciation or recognition of 
something as having value. Hence, motivation in normal human intentional actions 
involves cognition 一 desire is infused by, and inseparable from cognition. So one 
cannot make sense of (or attribute) motivation being due to desire in contrast to 
reason or cognition, since desire of this sort, as a motivating state, seems inseparable 
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from recognition of something as being valuable - and thus providing a reason for 
action. I dub desire of this kind "value-reflecting desire," since it involves the agent's 
appreciation or recognition of something as being valuable - and hence it reflects 
value in some way. 
In short, (1) usually raw desire as mere urge is insufficient to motivate a normal 
person and (2) value-reflecting desire is no mere conative state, it involves a certain 
cognitive element, and hence conation is not cognition-free.^ 
IV. The Fusionist Alternative 
A. Fusionist account of motivation: 
Overview of the argument 
In what follows I will sketch the argument in support of a fusionist account of 
motivation. If the argument is sound, then a fusionist account presents a great 
challenge to traditional approaches that presuppose a dichotomy between reason 
(cognition) and desire (conation). I will begin by outlining the fusionist argument. 
Then I will elaborate and argue for the premises in the following sub-sections. 
Pl . l Characteristic human interests or concerns are in some sense rooted in human 
9 The terms "raw desire" and “value-reflecting desire" are borrowed from Chris Fraser. 
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biological, psycho-biological, or rational nature. Something is a characteristic 
human interest or concern only if it is in some sense required by, fulfills, or 
enhances some aspect of human l i f e .� 
PI.2 If something is a characteristic human interest or concern, it is potentially 
motivating. 
P2 For a human agent to see something as a value or a disvalue (which is connected 
to human life), it must be connected to a characteristic human interest or 
concern." 
P3.1 To see anything as worthwhile or valuable, from any point of view, we must be 
able to see it as worth wanting. This general requirement is the basis of the 
distinction between raw desire — including crude, irrational, or bizarre urges -
and value-reflecting desire that connects with genuine value and thus provides 
reasons for action (see Griffin 1996: 28). 
P3.2 To judge (or perceive) that something is worthwhile (i.e. cognitive appreciation) 
is inseparable from the judgment (or perception) that it's worth wanting (i.e. 
conative reaction). Hence, cognition is inseparable from conation. 
P4 (a) When someone engages in practical deliberation, she wants to find out what it 
For example, health is a characteristic human interest in the sense that it is required by (or fulfills, 
or enhances) human biological needs. For health is constitutive to human survival. 
1 ‘ For instance, keeping a balanced diet is a value (or something worthwhile for us to do) because it is 
constitutive to one's health. Having MacDonald's frequently is a disvalue, for it is harmful to one's 
health. Hence, something is a value or a disvalue cannot be detached from a characteristic human 
interest. 
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would be worthwhile for her to do. (b) In the case of normal intentional action, an 
agent "should see what he wants under the aspect of some good" (Anscombe 
1957: 74). “Desires of this sort aim at the good: an agent's normal behavior is to 
recognize interests and to act to meet them" (Griffin 1996: 27). Hence, desires 
issuing from (a) practical deliberation or (b) in the case of normal intentional 
action are not blind; they aim at the worthwhile. Desires of these two sorts are 
not mere conation, or brute sentimental reactions; certain standards of 
appropriateness (or worthwhileness) are essential to their being the desires that 
they are. Conation of these two sorts cannot be separated from certain cognitive 
elements. In short, conation is not free of cognition. 
P5 Someone's recognizing something as a value or a disvalue cannot be detached 
from the characteristic human conative reaction to it. For example, my 
recognizing pain as a disvalue cannot be detached from the characteristic human 
conative response to it. Hence, cognition is not free of conation. 
Therefore, 
C6/ P6 Conation is not free of cognition; and cognition is not free of conation. They 
are inseparably fused together. Let's call this central fusionist thesis the 
"inseparability thesis" (cf. Griffin 2000: 290). 12 
12 Griffin himself calls it "the inseparability conclusion" (2000: 290). This conclusion is what the 
fusionist wants to argue for. There can be two senses of the idea of inseparable, namely conceptual 
and functional. The inseparability thesis fusionism attempts to argue for is a conceptual one basically. 
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P7 It is a fairly small, though not entirely straight, step from a value (which is 
connected to a characteristic human interest or concern) to a reason for action (or 
a practical reason). 
Therefore, 
C8 Grasping a practical reason (through a process of practical reasoning) involves 
both cognition and conation. Cognitive appreciation of a reason for action 
involves a "motivationally coloured reaction." Hence, grasping a practical reason 
is capable of motivating a person. 
B. Human nature, characteristic human interests, and values^^: 
Elaboration for PI andP2 
Characteristic human interests emerge from our human nature. Human nature can 
be roughly divided into three aspects, namely biological, psycho-biological, and 
rational. Particularly emerged from our biological nature are certain biological 
interests - for food, health, and protection of our capabilities. In respect of our 
psycho-biological nature, we have certain interests - for examples - for company, 
affection, and reproduction. Both biological and psycho-biological interests emerge 
from our biological (or animal) nature. 
That is, conation cannot be described independently fo cognition, and vice versa. 13 Cf. Griffin 1996: 5 4 - 5 . 
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We are not just biological beings; we are reflective beings. And it is natural for 
such beings to form second-order desires, and hence we have certain non-biological 
interests - for accomplishment^'^ and deep personal relations^^ These non-biological 
interests emerge from (or more appropriately, "partly constitute") our rational nature. 
This shift from biological to non-biological interests brings with it another shift 
that we cannot ignore. It is a shift from "predominantly experiential sorts of harm" to 
"non-experiential sorts of harm" (Griffin 1996: 55). The former includes harm such 
as pain and ailment, which are "fairly easily identified" (Griffin 55). The latter 
includes harm such as lack of accomplishment, lack of deep personal relations. 
How do I know that lack of food is harmful? It is simple, observe the physical 
symptoms. How do I know that lack of accomplishment is harmful? It is because 
“life is empty in a certain way，’ (Griffin 55). In this way, we associate 
accomplishment with something that gives life weight or point. A life without any 
accomplishment is in some sense "empty." If I know that you accomplish nothing in 
your life, I know that you are less well off. Hence, lack of accomplishment is harmful 
to one's quality of life, and hence it is a disvalue. 
We may conclude that (P2) something is a value or a disvalue only if it is 
14 I should follow Griffin (1996: 25) in conceiving accomplishment as something gives life weight or 
point. 
In respect of deep personal relations, Griffin says, "When personal relations become deep, 
reciprocal relations of friendship and love, then they have a value apart from the pleasure and profit 
they bring" (1996: 30). 
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connected to a characteristic human interest or concern. And I assume that (PI.2) a 
characteristic human interest or concern is potentially motivating. Hence, it seems 
natural to say that (P3.1) perceiving something as worthwhile or valuable is to see it 
as worth wanting. If someone judges that something is valuable (cognitive 
appreciation) for him to do, this judgment is inseparable from another judgment that 
it's worth wanting (conative reaction) (P.3.2). Hence, cognition is inseparable from 
conation. I will argue for this last claim in sub-section D. 
C. Conative reaction is inseparable from cognitive appreciation: 
Argument for P4 
There are different sorts of desires. We can classify them roughly into two groups, 
namely raw desire and value-reflecting desire. In this section, I argue that 
value-reflecting desires - desires that are part of normal intentional action - are no 
mere conative reactions. Conation of this sort is not cognition-free. To reach this 
conclusion I will begin with raw desires. 
A raw desire is something that we passively observe its occurring in us. Usually, 
we do not associate ourselves with it because it is present without our endorsement. 
Some raw desires are, in effect, "unwelcome afflictions,，(Griffin 1996: 72). For 
example, obsession with sex or money, compulsion to gamble, addiction to alcohol 
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or drugs, craving for chocolate, and so on. Some raw desires are "mere urges, coming 
from we know not where and we know not why, inclining us this way and that" 
(Griffin 1996: 33). We want to resist them; we want to rid ourselves of their presence 
or dominance as much as we could. "They would be for us an alien intrusion, no part 
of owr motivation" (Griffin 1996: 33). 
A value-reflecting desire is a desire formed with cognitive appreciation of the 
nature of its object (i.e. what is desired) (see Griffin 1996: 22 - 3). This sort of desire 
is at the heart of a deliberative conception of human action. In one sense, my 
conceiving myself as an agent is seeing myself as a deliberator or a chooser. My 
agency 一 partly my ability to deliberate or make choices - is manifested in a stream 
of intentional actions. In the case of normal intentional actions, I both have an aim 
and have beliefs about how to bring it about, so I am not reduced to the role of an 
observer with regard to my own actions. My practical deliberation and my intentional 
action aim at meeting interests or avoiding their frustration (Griffin 1996: 72). Hence, 
desires in this context are no mere sentimental reactions. They are inseparable from 
the cognitive appreciation of the worthwhile, (see Griffin 1996: 32) Without 
recognizing this point, it will be difficult for us to make sense of our distinction 
between mere wanting (or raw desire) and the sort of wanting that connects with the 
worthwhile (or reasons for action). 
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By understanding a value-reflecting desire as something one would want if one 
cognitively appreciated the object of desire, this account shifts importance away 
from the mere occurrence of desire on to the nature of its object. It seems that desire 
is left playing very little role in motivation. Still, desire regains its significance in 
another place. To recognize the nature of the relevant object is to see it under some 
desirability characterization, such as "accomplishment." These desirability 
characterizations give reasons for action, and those reasons in turn interlock with 
characteristic human motivation. So what one recognizes embodies some element of 
human conative reaction, (cf. Griffin 1996: 3 5 - 6 ) Hence, cognition of reasons for 
action is not conation-free. I will argue for this point in the coming sub-section. 
D. Cognition is not conation-free: 
Argument for P5 
In this section, I want to argue that part of the explanation of the status of a value, 
as a reason for action, has to bring it into connection with human interests and 
desires. Cognitive appreciation of a reason for action cannot be detached from 
reaction, (see Griffin 1996: 32) 
Why do some people find it hard to accept that cognition alone can generate a new 
motive? They find it hard to accept that a purely cognitive exercise of the intellect 
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can generate any new motive, since motives seem conative in nature (see Griffin 
1996: 33). But this distrust of the motivational efficacy of intellection depends on our 
assuming conation and cognition are ftilly distinct (see Griffin 33). 
Let's consider a case of moral reasoning. Suppose a person watched TV news and 
was informed that there was tsunami in Southeast Asia. He pitied those on the street 
with no parents and with no home to go to. These people were without family. He 
asked himself, "Should I do something to help these people?" He carried out his 
reasoning as follows: 
Normally, family is important for one's life, for one's psycho-biological needs. 
People with their family destroyed in a tsunami experience pain. 
If we truly understand the disvalue term 'pain,' we understand that, typically, 
humans want to avoid it or have it alleviated. This is normal for humans, but not 
necessarily true of every individual human. (A few individuals might both know 
what "pain" means and not have those typical conative reactions.) 
Suppose the man continues, "Family is important for humans generally, and 
having one's family being destroyed is painful. Typically, humans want to avoid pain 
or have it alleviated, so I have good reason to do something to alleviate these 
people's pain." 16 He thus makes a generous donation to Red Cross. 
16 This example would seem a bit strange. It is because no (mentally or psychologically) normal 
person would reason the way I describe here. The basic point I want to make is that just by perceiving 
something as pain, one perceives it as the kind of thing one should try to alleviate if one can. I thank 
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In this piece of moral reasoning, cognitive appreciation of a disvalue (specifically, 
recognizing pain as a disvalue) involves conative response. One doesn't completely 
understand the disvalue term 'pain' unless one also understands that, typically 
humans want to avoid it or have it alleviated. We understand the concept of 'pain' 
only by learning it in contexts in which we ourselves feel pain and probably contexts 
in which we feel sympathy for others in pain, and thus have a conative reaction. So 
recognition of a painful situation is inextricably related to our conative responses. 
Without them, we wouldn't have the concept of ‘pain,，and recognizing something as 
‘pain，is in normal cases having a conative reaction to it.^ ^ The conative element in 
pain is not entirely separable from the cognitive element. This inseparability comes 
from the fact that our standard of sameness in the sensations that we group together 
under the concept ‘pain，is partly that they are characteristically to be avoided, or 
alleviated regardless of the pain is ours or others'. Our conative response is 
constitutive to our cognition. So part of the criterion for its use involves 
characteristic human response (or conation), (see Griffin 2000: 295 - 6) Hence, 
cognition is inseparable from conation. 
Chris Fraser for this remark. 
17 I thank Chris for helping me to clarify the role of conative element in cognition. 
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E. Characteristic human interests, values, and reasons for action: 
Elaboration for P7 (cf. Griffin 1996: 73 - 4) 
As stated in P2, something is a value or a disvalue - for a human agent - only if it 
is connected to a characteristic human interest or concern. For instance, health is a 
characteristic human interest. Doing exercises properly and regularly is a value (or 
something worthwhile for us to do) because it is constitutive to our health. According 
to P7, it is a fairly small, though not entirely straight, step from a value (which is 
connected to a general human interest) to a reason for action (or a practical reason). 
Knowing that doing exercises properly and regularly is a value, there is a reason for 
you to do so, though it doesn't mean that the reason is in all cases indefeasible. In 
other words, value always has some motivating power 一 recognizing it is "feeling" 
the motivating power - though the power is defeasible. 
If something is a value, then it generates a reason unless rationally defeated by 
other reason-giving considerations. The step to a reason for a particular agent is not 
direct because we must recognize other reason-generating considerations. Let's 
consider an example. Generally, human beings have an interest in avoiding pain, or 
have it alleviated. Pain is a disvalue. Just recognition of your pain as pain already 
gives me a reason to alleviate it; but I may have other reasons not to. Other 
considerations can defeat my reason to alleviate your pain. 
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P5 states that recognizing something as a value or a disvalue cannot be detached 
from the characteristic human response (reaction) to it. P7 states that if something is 
a value or a disvalue connecting to a characteristic human interest — let's say an 
interest in avoiding pain 一 then it generates a reason unless rationally defeated by 
other reason-giving considerations. It follows that recognition of a potential reason 
for action involves a motivationally colored reaction. Therefore, grasping a potential 
practical reason is capable of motivating a person (C8). 
V. Three Merits of the Fusionist Account 
There are three advantages of a fiisionist account of motivation. First, a fusionist 
account assimilates an important truth behind the Humean position, namely a general 
requirement that a practical reason (or practical reasoning) has to interlock with 
characteristic human motivation (concern or response). Second, it can account for the 
rationalist's core belief that cognition has an important role to play in giving rise to 
rational actions. Third, it can avoid some typical problems encountered by any 
theories of motivation accepting a sharp distinction between reason (cognition) and 
desire (conation). 
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1 Q 
A. An important truth behind Humean position 
There is an important truth behind Humean position. Strong comprehensive 
Humeanism claims that the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning (or a 
practical reason) must be backed by some element of an agent's pre-existent 
motivational set (cf. Williams 1980). That seems too strong. What seems correct is 
that the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning (or a practical reason) has to 
interlock, in a way still to be explained, with human motivation. 
Before I proceed to elaborate on this important truth, I want to say more about the 
term "an agent's pre-existent motivational set" and the term "human motivation." 
The former may imply 一 but not necessarily - the subjective aspect of what is inside 
an agent's motivational set. What is inside an agent's motivational set varies from 
person to person. The latter implies or emphasizes the general aspect of what is 
inside human psychology. It focuses on the basic elements (or structure) of 
motivation shared by human beings — without denying that there can be wide 
variations in the way superficial motivational elements are arranged in particular 
individuals. 
If the distinction between a subjective conception of motivation and a general 
conception of motivation is sound, then there are at least two different ways of 
18 In working out this point, I have borrowed much from Griffin (1996: 34 - 5). 
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approaching the relation between practical reason and motivation. On the one hand, 
based on a rather subjective conception of motivation, one may develop a skeptical 
or limited view about the motivational efficacy of practical r e a s o n ] 9 On the other 
hand, based on a rather general conception of motivation, one may develop a 
widened view about the motivating power of practical reason. 
I believe the important truth behind the Humean position rests on the general 
conception of motivation not the narrow conception. I will draw support from 
Hume's work. He gives an example. He says, 
"Ask a man why he uses exercises; he will answer, because he desires to 
keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires health’ he will readily 
reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquires farther, and 
desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. 
This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.... 
Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its 
immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection" 
(1751: 293; original italics). 
One keeps doing exercises for he wants to keep his health. Health is desirable 
because it can lower the likeliness of getting sick. Sickness is undesirable because it 
is painful. Pain is primarily undesirable. 
One's reason for doing exercises rests on something that is primarily undesirable. 
Something is primarily desirable or undesirable in the sense that it is not based on 
other secondarily desirable or undesirable things - in the above example, doing 
19 For example, see Williams's intemalism (1980), discussed in chapter 2. 
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exercises and maintaining health. By fulfilling certain secondarily desirable things 
(or avoiding certain secondarily undesirable things), one of our primarily desirable 
things (or one of our primarily undesirable things) - in the above example, pain -
will (or might) be fulfilled (or be avoided) (see Audi 1989: 43). 
Hume thinks that one's reason for doing a certain thing has to rest on a certain 
primarily desirable or undesirable thing. And it is primarily desirable or undesirable 
“because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection" 
(Hume 1751: 293). It is quite obvious that Hume is assuming a rather general 
conception of human motivation. The agent in the particular case is often not acting 
on the sort of ultimate end Hume alludes to. Such ends function as background 
sources of value.:� 
We may summarize Hume's view on motivation and practical reason in two claims. 
First, he believes that human motivation, which is taken to be characteristic human 
concern or conative response, emerges from or is in agreement with human sentiment 
and affection. Second, he believes that practical reason has to interlock with such 
human motivation. 
The important insight behind the Humean position involves two interconnected 
claims. First, human motivation, which is taken to be characteristic human concerns 
This point - stated in the last two sentences - is reminded by Chris Fraser. 
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or responses, is rooted in human nature or human life (or more specifically, human 
sentiment and affection). Second, practical reasoning can move a person to belief or 
to action. 
This does not mean that we embrace the claim that to be a piece of practical reason, 
reasoning, it must be capable of motivating all individuals. Certainly, a psychopath 
might understand a moral reason (or could follow the steps of a piece of moral 
reasoning), but be entirely unmoved by it. Also, someone living in despair might 
understand some important prudential reasons (for instance, that he has to take good 
care of his health), and not care a bit (he keeps ignoring his health). 
The important truth behind Humean position is a general requirement: that a 
practical reason (or reasoning) has to interlock with characteristic human concern or 
response.^' 
B. Respect the role of cognition 
A fusionist account can take care of the rationalist's central doctrine that cognition 
has a crucial role to play in the field of practical rationality.^^ The fusionist 
understands a value-reflecting desire - which is part of normal intentional action — as 
something one would want if one cognitively (and properly?) appreciated the object 
21 This is an important but controversial thesis. It deserves more discussions. However, I don't have 
anything concrete to say about it now. 
22 For example, Korsgaard's (1986) version of CMI. 
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of desire. This account shifts importance away from the mere occurrence of desire on 
to the nature of its object. Value-reflecting desire is not simply a sentiment of 
approval (or disapproval); certain standards of appropriateness or worthwhileness are 
essential to its being the reaction that it is. Up to this point, the fusionist account 
echoes the rationalist account of motivation. They both emphasize the importance of 
cognition in forming (and in characterizing) value-reflecting desire. A fusionist and a 
rationalist approaches both establish their views on a claim that agents see 
value-reflecting desire as involving a cognitive element (even if their judgment is 
wrong). 
But some rationalists embrace the separability of cognition and conation. The 
fusionist doesn't see cognition and conation as separable components in giving rise 
to rational actions because to recognize the rational grounds for action is already to 
feel their motivational pull, even if only slightly. Seeing a certain reason for action 
is inseparable from seeing the desirability features of the relevant object of desire. 
And the desirability features interlock with characteristic human motivation. If an 
agent sees a reason for action, his recognition is inseparable from his reaction. The 
response isn't the general response of someone else but a reaction of the agent 
himself. Hence, cognitive appreciation of a certain reason for action is inseparable 
23 On the Kantian view, cognition can give rise to motivation. On Griffin's view, presumably, these 
two are more conceptually linked. I thank Prof. Li Hon-lam for adding this note. 
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from a certain motivationally-colored human response or reaction. Hence, cognitive 
appreciation and conative response (or reaction) go hand in hand in an inseparable 
way in giving rise to rational (or reasonable) actions. 
C. Avoiding problems encountered by dichotomous theories 
Another advantage of the fusionist approach is that it can avoid some typical 
problems encountered by any theory of motivation presupposing a sharp distinction 
between cognition (reason) and conation (desire). Two typical problems encountered 
by dichotomous theories are these: 
i. The relevancy problem: what relevance have peoples' desires (or conative states) 
to what is worthwhile (interesting, morally sound, aesthetically fine, and so on) 
for them to do and thus what provides a genuine reason or justification for 
action? 
For the fusionist, it is not the case that desire (or conative state) is irrelevant to 
what is worthwhile for an agent to do. The sort of desire which is relevant in 
this case is value-reflecting desire, namely desire that is inseparable from 
cognitive appreciation of a certain standards of appropriateness or 
worthwhileness of the object (or action) in question. 
But dichotomous theories either downplay and even eliminate the relevancy of 
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desire (just like some extreme rationalists, for example pure cognitivists) or 
over-emphasize its role (like some radical Humeans, for example bald 
instrumentalists). 
One consequence of de-emphasizing or removing the role of desire may lead to 
the second problem, namely how (mere) cognition can give rise to rational (or 
reasonable) actions. Over-emphasizing the role of desire may lead to a strange 
consequence: what is worthwhile for one to do is determined by her desire, and 
hence whatever she desires is worthwhile. It is obviously wrong, for mere 
desiring for something doesn't straightly make this something worthwhile for 
one to do. 
ii. The second problem is about the motivating power of mere cognition. This sort 
of problem is real only if the dichotomy between pure cognition and pure 
conation in practical reasoning is legitimate. Accepting this dichotomy will lead 
one to this puzzle: if practical reasoning is a purely cognitive process, how can 
something purely cognitive in nature give rise to new motive? 
VI. Conclusion 
We may summarize the fusionist line of thought as follows. One of the 
constituents of practical deliberation or normal intentional human action is 
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value-reflecting desire. Value-reflecting desire can be conceived as a sort of conative 
reaction. However, it is no mere sentimental response. It is this sort of desire or 
reaction because it is inseparable from its cognitive element, namely cognitive 
appreciation of certain standards of appropriateness or worthwhileness of the thing or 
the action in question. 
The cognitive appreciation of certain standards of appropriateness or 
worthwhileness of the thing or the action in question is no mere cognition. This sort 
of cognitive appreciation is inseparable from recognizing the desirability features of 
the thing or the action in question. And the desirability characterizations are 
interlocked with certain characteristic human interests or concerns. Hence, this sort 
of cognition is inseparable from certain conative elements. 
Hence, cognition is not merely recognition. Conation is not merely reaction. 
Cognition and conation are inseparable in the agent's grasping of a certain reason or 
value or undertaking rational or reasonable actions. 
So, what can we leam from the fusionist's attempt? It tries to show us that the 
long-lasting debate about the motivational efficacy of practical deliberation may rest 
on some misleading or unquestioned assumptions. No matter the fusionist own 
solution is successful or not, it does show us another alternative in handling the 
debate. 
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The ftisionist account worked out here is rather tentative. But I think that this 
approach deserves our attention. For its failure or its success will deepen our 




In philosophy generally, and certainly in the sort of project I am embarking on, 
w e are at present, and always shall be, groping in the dark simply to get a sense 
of some of the large contours of our subject. One's only reasonable hope is that, 
by groping, one will find something, and that others will take a look. (Griffin 
1996: 2) 
I. Introduction 
In this concluding chapter I will review the approaches to the motivational 
question discussed in chapters 2 through 5.1 will underscore the weaknesses of CMI 
and strong Humeanism, while highlighting the strengths of quasi-Humeanism and the 
fusionist approach. I contend that quasi-Humeanism and the fusionist alternative 
deserve further investigation for they offer new light on the motivational problem. 
Next, in the third section, I will discuss the potential inadequacy of CMI. Since 
CMI assumes the unity between theoretical reason and practical reason, people can 
challenge its convincingness by arguing that there is no unity (or significant 
difference) between these two fields or capacities. 
In the fourth section I will show one serious problem encountered by the Humeans. 
Since most Humeans argue that the motivational efficacy of practical reasoning is 
somehow connected to the agent's conative states, it is essential for them to work out 
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a plausible conception of desire. However, I will show that their attempted 
conception of desire encounters a dilemma - either it is too narrow or it is too broad. 
Moreover, if it is too broad, it becomes trivially true and substantively empty. 
Finally, in the last section, I raise the question of whether the principle of desire-in, 
desire-out, or PDIO is exclusively reserved for Humeans. This question is very 
important. If PDIO is not reserved for the Humeans, then Humeans cannot 
distinguish their position effectively from other theories which also rely on PDIO. 
II. Seeing the Point of a Rational Consideration and Being Motivated 
From chapter 2 to chapter 5，I have explored and argued for alternatives in 
explaining the motivational efficacy of practical reason. According to CMI (chapter 
2), seeing the point of a rational consideration (i.e. cognitive appreciation) can entail 
that the agent has a relevant motive (i.e. conative response), just as understanding the 
soundness of an argument can convince an agent to do something rationally implied 
by or connected to the argument. 
CMI is unacceptable to strong Humeanism (chapter 3), which holds that the 
motivating power of practical reason comes from an agent's conative states. 
Humeanism in general disbelieves the claim that pure cognition alone can generate a 
new motive, which is characteristically (but not necessarily merely) conative in 
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nature. Humeanism holds that for something to have a conative output, there must be 
a conative input. Hence conation is an essential component in explaining the 
motivational efficacy of practical reason. 
However, strong Humeanism makes two unquestioned assumptions. First, it 
presupposes an instrumentalist picture of practical reasoning, which assumes that 
human agents can be motivated only by having pre-existing ends or forming new 
ends. Second, it assumes an unreasonably narrow conception of motivation - that 
motivation is something equivalent to, reducible to, or dependent on the agent's 
conative, affective, or sentimental states. 
Another useful framework in explaining the functioning of practical reason is 
offered by quasi-Humeanism (chapter 4). While CMI and strong Humeanism attempt 
to explain motivational efficacy on a single level, quasi-Humeanism tries to 
understand the functioning of practical reason in terms of two levels, or a 
foreground/ background framework. The foreground level comprises the content of 
practical deliberation, which may be represented as a piece of practical reasoning. 
The background level provides enabling conditions for the functioning of the 
foreground. 
Quasi-Humeans argue that desire is not always present in the foreground. However, 
for the foreground to function, desire must be present in the background. Background 
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desire is a necessary enabling condition for the functioning of the foreground. An 
agent may perceive the point of a rational consideration in the foreground. Her being 
motivated by this rational consideration has to be explained by her background desire 
to do whatever she would recognize as worthwhile for her to do in the foreground. In 
other words, for the convincingness of the consideration to take effect in the 
foreground, there must be a background desire to do whatever would be recognized 
as worthwhile in the foreground. For the content of practical reasoning to take effect, 
there must be a background desire, functioning as a necessary enabling condition for 
the efficacy of the foreground, though without figuring in the foreground. 
If I decided or intended to do x because of reason r，then reason r explains my 
decision or intention. The explanation of my decision or intention to do x is in terms 
of reasons. The enabling condition - the background desire 一 is necessary for the 
explanation to go through, but it is not part of the explanation itself. This is an 
important proposal by quasi-Humeanism] 
Quasi-Humeans may criticize CMI for neglecting or de-emphasizing the 
difference between the foreground and the background of practical reasoning. CMI 
attempts to argue for the claim that cognitive appreciation of a rational consideration 
can entail the agent has a relevant motive. But if CMI is true, it is true only in the 
1 I think this proposal deserves more attention and further investigation. However, I am not able to do 
so in this thesis. 
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foreground level. For the foreground to function, there must be the presence of a 
background desire, namely the disposition to do whatever would be recognized as 
worthwhile in the foreground. Hence, desire still has a role to play in explaining the 
motivating power of practical reason. 
But quasi-Humeanism encounters a serious problem. It is doubtful whether the 
background dispositions it posits are properly considered a form of desire, and 
whether they are identifiable as desires, having specific prepositional contents. They 
may be so general and vague that calling them "desires" it distorts our normal 
concept of'desire.' 
While the version of quasi-Humeanism I discussed may not be able to answer 
these questions, the two-level framework it provides deserves further attention. If the 
two-level framework is convincing, then we may investigate the motivational 
efficacy of practical reasoning from a new angle. We may ask whether desire is 
always present in the foreground. This question is different from the question 
whether desire, or some motivating dispositions, is always present in the background. 
And another important question is how the foreground is connected to the 
background. These questions may lead to a new approach to the motivation question. 
CMI, Humeanism and quasi-Humeanism assume a sharp dichotomy between 
reason (understood as cognitive evaluation) and desire (conceived as conative 
Conclusion 159 
reaction). The fusionist (chapter 5) criticizes the unquestioned assumptions that there 
is a distinct boundary between reason (cognition) and desire (conation) and that there 
is a motivational priority between reason (cognition) and desire (conation). The 
fusionist argues that grasping a reason for action is constituted by both cognition and 
conation and they interlock and interpenetrate. 
The fusionist approach worked out in chapter 5 is tentative and sketchy. Instead of 
offering a comprehensive and detailed fusionist theory of motivation, I outlined only 
the skeleton which might be necessary for a non-dichotomous theory. 
III. The Inadequacies of CMI? 
CMI assumes a unity between theoretical and practical reason. More explicitly, it 
models practical rationality upon theoretical rationality. To be theoretically or 
practically rational requires the same capacities: (1) to be able to perform certain 
rational mental operations through which one is able to judge whether an argument is 
sound or whether a consideration is reasonable or compelling; and at the same time 
(2) to allow the transmission of the compellingness of the argument or a 
consideration to one's motivation, and hence one is moved to do something 
agreeably. 
A sound argument can convince a theoretically rational person. Similarly, a 
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rational consideration can move a practically rational person. As Korsgaard (1986: 
15) says, theoretically, for an argument to be a good one, or practically for a 
consideration to be a reasonable one, it must be capable of convincing or motivating 
a person when his conditions of being rational are not being interrupted. 
One can question whether it is suitable to model practical rationality on theoretical 
rationality. While one can agree that a theoretically rational person is just one who is 
normally convinced by a sound argument, one may question whether a practically 
rational person is just one who is normally moved by rational considerations. 
To settle the above dispute, we have to examine the relation between theoretical 
reason and practical reason: what are the differences, if any, between theoretical 
reason and practical reason? This question deserves further in-depth discussion, but it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
IV. The Dilemma of a Humean Conception of Desire 
As I argued in chapter 3, a phenomenological conception of desire is too narrow, 
and hence it excludes some cases in which desire can justifiably be attributed to an 
agent. Desire has content but not necessarily any universal phenomenological 
features. We can attribute desire to people without them experiencing any particular 
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feeling. Obviously, any plausible form of Humeanism will not rest on a 
phenomenological conception of desire. 
On the other hand, a dispositional conception of desire is too broad, and therefore 
includes cases in which it seems unjustifiable to attribute desire to an agent. Desires 
can be conceived as dispositions to act in a certain ways under certain conditions. A 
subject's desire to cp can be conceived as a state of that subject that grounds all his 
relevant dispositions to (p under certain conditions such as the disposition to cp in 
conditions C, in conditions C, and so on. If one identifies desire with dispositions to 
act in a certain ways under certain circumstances, one will include some cases in 
which desire attribution seems strange (if not false). For example, suppose you tell 
me p ID q and p, then by my disposition, I naturally think that q. It is obviously 
strange to say that I desire to infer q. Hence, the dispositional conception is too broad; 
it includes cases in which desire attributions are unsuitable.^ So a Humeanism based 
on a dispositional conception of desire would also be implausible. 
There is another serious problem with the dispositional conception. If a Humean 
combines his theory of motivation with this conception, such a combination would 
make his theory trivially true. Surely, one acts (mental operations or bodily motions) 
in a certain way (partly) because of certain dispositions sufficient to move one to act. 
2 For this point, see chapter 3，§ IV, B, b. 
3 For this point, see chapter 3，§ IV’ B, d. 
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If a Humean identifies all sorts of motivating dispositions with desire, he can arrive 
at the conclusion that all of an agent's actions are (partly) due to desires. But this 
move is unconvincing, for it amounts to declaring Humeanism true by definition. 
Hence, this move makes his position trivially tme.4 
Since most Humeans hold that the motivating force of practical reasoning is 
connected to the agent's conative states in some way, they must provide a plausible 
conception of desire. But their attempted conception of desire encounters a 
dilemma - either it is too narrow or it is too broad. Besides, if it is too broad, it 
becomes trivially true and substantively empty. 
Though quasi-Humeanism offers a new framework to the motivational question, 
its conception of desire is too broad. I think a plausible Humeanism would be a 
product which preserves the strength of quasi-Humeanism on the one hand, and 
overcomes the Humeanism's dilemma on the other. In this thesis, I have done the 
first part only; I leave the second part for further investigation. 
V. PDIO: Is it exclusively reserved for Humeanism? 
Humeanism in general holds that an agent's intention or desire to intend in 
accordance with the conclusion of a piece of reasoning must come from a certain 
4 I thank Chris Fraser for this point. 
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conative input. I call this the principle of desire-in, desire-out, or PDIO. Different 
varieties of Humeanism attempt to characterize or argue for this principle. 
If PDIO is the central belief of Humeanism, we may question if it is exclusively 
reserved for Humeanism. May some other non-Humean theories of motivation be 
compatible with or draw support from PDIO? 
Weak comprehensive rationalism holds that evaluative beliefs - beliefs about what 
it would be worthwhile to do - must be supplemented by conative states (desires) in 
motivating an agent. However, the relevant conative states (desires) can themselves 
be generated or entailed by evaluative beliefs. For some versions of this line of 
thought, see Nagel (1970), Korsgaard (1986) and Wallace (1990). 
To know whether PDIO is exclusively reserved for Humeanism, we need further 
investigation. This question deserves our attention. If, finally, we find out that PDIO 
is not reserved for Humeanism, then it cannot separate itself successfully from other 
theories which also depend on PDIO.� 
VI. Conclusion: 
Groping in the dark 
Finally, I would like to return to the question I tried to answer throughout this 
5 Wallace (1990) tries to argue that PDIO is not necessarily reserved for Humeanism. 
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thesis - that is, the motivational question. When we ask how practical reasoning can 
give rise to motivation, how should we handle this question? Basically, an answer 
would probably involve a view on the roles of and the connection between reason, 
desire, and motivation. Since these three concepts are so general, vague and 
ambiguous, and hence are hard to define or grasp, working out a satisfactory theory 
connecting them in an appropriate way becomes difficult. In answering the question, 
it seems that I was "groping in the dark." And through groping, I hope that I could 
"get a sense of some of the large contours" of the problem, and that "others will take 
a look" (see Griffin 1996: 2). 
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